Daily Report

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FBIS-EEU-93-249 *30 December 1993*

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.
An Ω indicates a Foreign Media Note.

BULGARIA

Russian Envoy Apologizes for Zhirinovskiy *[Sofia Radio]* 1
Croatian Ambassador Comments on Relations *[SVOBODEN NAROD 23-29 Dec]* 1
Article Views Zhelev's Efforts To Join NATO *[KONTINENT 24 Dec]* 2
Chief Prosecutor Confirms Doynov's Arrest *[Sofia Radio]* 3
Faces Embezzlement Charges *[BTA]* 3

CZECH REPUBLIC

Plans To Sell Tamara Radar to Iran Denied *[CTK]* 4
Army, Industry Officials Discuss Arms Projects *[LIDOVE NOVINY 28 Dec]* 4
Foreign Ministry on January NATO Summit *[DENNI TELEGRAF 27 Dec]* 4
Klaus Signs Administrative Reform Timetable *[Prague Radio]* 5
Morovian Party Doubts Timetable *[Prague Radio]* 5
Prime Minister Klaus Reviews 1993 *[CTK]* 5
Parties Evaluate 1993 Political, Economic Events *[CTK]* 5

SLOVAKIA

Kovac Looks at Independence in New Year's Speech *[CTK]* 6
Finance Ministry: No Import Tax *[CTK]* 6
No Agreement in Minister's Talks With RFE *[Prague Radio]* 7
Party To Propose Hofbauer Resignation *[CTK]* 7
Conservative Democrats Call For New Elections *[CTK]* 7
Envoy Views Problems in Relations With Czechs *[CTK]* 7
Andrejcak, U.S. Envoy Discuss NATO Summit *[CTK]* 8
Natural Gas Prices To Increase 25 Percent *[CTK]* 8

HUNGARY

Interview Assesses Russian 'Danger,' NATO *[MAGYAR NEMZET 24 Dec]* 9
Horn Calls For Autonomy for Minority in Slovakia *[CESKY DENIK 28 Dec]* 13

POLAND

Prime Minister Addresses Sejm on Economy *[Warsaw Radio]* 14
Walesa on Joining NATO, Role of Army *[Warsaw TV]* 16
News Conference Reported *[Warsaw Radio]* 16
Foreign Minister Argues for NATO Membership *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 29 Dec]* 16
Government Concordat With Vatican Debated 19
'Committee of Experts' Comments *[PAP]* 19
Official Seeks Amendments *[PAP]* 20
Government Issues Statement *[Warsaw Radio]* 20
Bonds Sold Abroad To Help Finance Deficit *[PAP]* 21
Government, Miners Solidarity Sign Protocol *[Warsaw TV]* 21
Striking Miners Insist on 'Concrete' Proposals *[Warsaw TV]* 21

ROMANIA

Further Reaction to Comments by Zhirinovskiy 22
Senators Condemn Statements *[ROMPRES]* 22
Russian Envoy 'Dissociates Himself' *[Bucharest Radio]* 22
Visa Refusal Considered *[ROMPRES]* 22
PDSR 'Firmly Condemns' Comments *[Bucharest Radio]* 22
Defense Ministry Ready To Join NATO *[Bucharest Radio]* 23
Melescanu on NATO Integration *[ROMPRES]* 23
Officials Explains Privatization Slowdown *[ROMPRES]* 23
Roman Outlines National Pact Goals *[Bucharest Radio]* 24
Foreign Debt Exceeds $3 Billion *[ROMPRES]* 24

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Serbs Fire on NATO Planes Over Teocak *[Sarajevo Radio]* 25
Serbs, UNPROFOR Convoy Exchange Fire *[AFP]* 25
Krajisnik Foresees 1994 Union With Bosnian Serbs *[TANJUG]* 25
Krajisnik Discusses Maps, Territory Issues *[VECERNJE NOVOSTI 26 Dec]* 25
Herceg-Bosna Assembly Briefed on Negotiations *[Zagreb Radio]* 26
Krajisnik Comments on Fighting *[TANJUG]* 27
Army Chief Accuses Serbia of Sending Troops *[AFP]* 27
Interior Minister Interviewed on Foreign Tour *[Sarajevo Radio]* 28
Commentary on Croat Reaction to Muslim Actions *[Mostar Radio]* 29
Sarajevo Evacuation Convoy Reaches Croatia *[AFP]* 30
TANJUG Reports Fighting on Various Fronts 30

CROATIA

General Bobetko Interviewed on Krajina, Bosnia *[Zagreb TV]* 31
Krajina Election Runoff Postponed to 23 Jan *[TANJUG]* 33
Babic Accused of Rigging Krajina Elections *[VECERNJE NOVOSTI 20 Dec]* 33
Italian Minority Leader Explains Demands *[VECERNJI LIST 22 Dec]* 34

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Anti-Inflation Measures To Be Implemented *[TANJUG]* 37
Official Predicts Gradual Lifting of Sanctions *[Belgrade Radio]* 37
Army Chief Discusses Balkan Conflicts *[TANJUG]* 37

Serbia

SPS Prepared To Discuss Coalition Government *[Belgrade Radio]* 41
Sarajevo Evacuees Arrive in Serbian Village *[TANJUG]* 41

Montenegro

Commentary Warns Against Sarajevo Partition *[MONITOR 17 Dec]* 41
Opposition Blames Authorities for 'All Evils' *[Belgrade Radio]* 42

Kosovo

Organizers of Kosovo Sportsman Award Detained *[TANJUG]* 43

Russian Envoy Apologizes for Zhirinovskiy

AU2912143993 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Report by Silviya Velikova]

[Text] President Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev today received Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Avdeyev. During the meeting, they exchanged views on bilateral relations between the two states and on European issues.

Dr. Zhelev handed Ambassador Avdeyev a letter for transmission to President Yeltsin concerning future steps to consolidate stability in Europe, the possibilities for reducing tension on the continent, and the future evolution of economic and cultural links between Bulgaria and Russia.

After the meeting ended, Ambassador Avdeyev said that the subject of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's visit to Bulgaria came up during their discussion. The Russian ambassador expressed regret for the fact that certain Russian citizens making private visits to Bulgaria permit themselves to make statements that conform neither to the ethical norms nor to the standard of conduct expected of a politician. In his capacity as Russian ambassador to Bulgaria, Avdeyev offered apologies through President Zhelev to the Bulgarian authorities.

Croatian Ambassador Comments on Relations

AU2812145193 Sofia SVOBODEN NAROD in Bulgarian 23-29 Dec 93 p 16

[Interview with Bernardo Jurlina, Croatian ambassador to Bulgaria, by Teodor Dechev and Gancho Savov; place and date not given: "Serbian Diplomacy Troubles You, But This Does Not Hinder Our Relations"]

[Excerpts] [SVOBODEN NAROD] Your Excellency, more than one year has passed since your arrival in Bulgaria. Could you share your impressions of the development of relations between Bulgaria and Croatia?

[Jurlina] I think that political relations between Croatia and Bulgaria constantly strengthen on the basis of sincere political understanding. Perhaps recently the Serbian diplomacy troubles you, but this cannot hinder relations between Bulgaria and Croatia. The Croatian foreign minister already visited Sofia, and the results of his visit are well-known. For their part, Bulgarian Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Ikonomov, representatives of your Constitutional Court, and other responsible officials also visited Croatia.

As far as economic relations are concerned, neither Croatia nor Bulgaria could be satisfied with their level. Our trade exchanges amount to only $15 million. A few days ago I had a conversation with Deputy Premier Mr. Karabashev. A trade agreement between Bulgaria and Croatia was signed, but it will be difficult to implement it both because of the war and because of the lack of a direct transportation link. The fact that neither Bulgaria knows what Croatia produces nor the Croats know the Bulgarian market is another negative factor. Therefore, we are preparing an exhibition-bazaar of Croatian goods, which will take place next year in Bulgaria. I hope that next spring there will be Croatian goods at the Plovdiv Fair.

The third sphere of our cooperation is related to culture. [passage omitted]

[SVOBODEN NAROD] Do you think that there are political circles which prevent the development of good relations between the two countries?

[Jurlina] This always is normal in the development of a democratic state. Under conditions of parliamentary democracy forces exist in Bulgaria which for example seek close relations with Milosevic's Socialists. Therefore, we protested at your Foreign Ministry when the leaders of the self-proclaimed Krajina Republic in Croatia visited Bulgaria. As you know, Paspalj visited Bulgaria. He was received by the Parliamentary Alliance for Social Democracy and by the minister of ecology. We went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and understood that the Bulgarian state was not behind the visit. Now we learned that deputies from your parliament were in Krajina during the absolutely illegal elections there. However, I am convinced that there is no chance of returning to the old practice in Croatia or Bulgaria.

[SVOBODEN NAROD] Let us return to the war in former Yugoslavia, and more specifically, in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you think that it is possible to forecast the end of the war in the foreseeable future?

[Jurlina] Every war and every supremacy have their end. This is what happened to the great powers of the Hitler-Mussolini Axis in World War II. Therefore, it is absolutely certain that all forms of nationalism and fascism after the fall of the Berlin Wall, as those we witness in Serbia, will also end. We hope that the talks in Geneva, the peaceful initiative of our president, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, and the common French-German proposals will have a positive effect. What will this effect be? In Croatia we cannot agree to the secessionists splitting our territory and ceding it to a new formation. Not a single Croat, and I think that the same applies to Europe and the world, will agree to changing the borders in such a manner.

As far as Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned—there are three nationalities that live there—Serbs, Croats, and let us call the third—Muslims. I think that it is realistic to form this entity as a union. One could not say how long all this will last. However, it would be a great tragedy if the war spreads to Kosovo and Macedonia. Now there again are claims that ten times more Serbs than there really are, live in Kosovo and Macedonia. You know that there also are problems with the national community of the Albanians. Nevertheless, I hope that soon there will be an end to the great Serbian aggressive imperial policy.

[SVOBODEN NAROD] How do you view the proclamation of the so-called Muslims in Bosnia as a separate nation? This indeed is a special case, where a religious affiliation is used for the separate formation of an ethnic group, without this group having other different characteristics such as language and origin....

[Jurlina] The following is the historical truth: Their nationality in the past was respectively Croatian and Serbian. However, during the time of communist Yugoslavia, under Tito's regime, they were proclaimed a nation in order to create a balance between the Serbs and the Croats. [passage omitted]

Article Views Zhelev's Efforts To Join NATO

AU2812164993 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 24 Dec 93 p 8

[Article by Svetoslav Terziev: "Unsuspectingly, NATO Has Started To Work for the Bulgarian Presidency"]

[Text] If it is true that diplomacy is the art of the possible, then President Zhelyu Zhelev should not feel he is an arts connoisseur in his campaign for Bulgaria to join NATO. He is the very one who one month ago urged the West "to do the impossible" and accept Bulgaria into the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO's full name), when he stated this at the congress of the Liberal International in Budapest.

It is almost certain that, despite its political feelings toward Eastern Europe, NATO will not commit itself to direct guarantees for the latter's security, because the region is an explosive one and might threaten the equilibrium in the West. This is even more valid for the Balkans, where the West's ill-fated experiment with the peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia is having an extremely discouraging effect in the discussion of any future military commitments in the region.

The U.S. "Partnership for Peace" initiative includes the explicit condition that it promises no guarantees for Eastern Europe's security.

Evidently, the campaign in aid of Bulgaria joining NATO is wishful rather than practical in its nature, which, if it not directed at directly strengthening our national security, may serve other goals. What are these goals?

From the foreign policy viewpoint, the campaign has no great value, but it is at least clear that it is not harming our national interests. It serves as yet another demonstration of our allegiance to the West, which, in fact, forms the basis for the country's new foreign policy. The risk of the campaign worsening our relations with Russia and of it backfiring in an unpleasant way on our national economy is not large because everyone realizes that Bulgaria's candidature to join NATO is not achievable, at least in the near future. Furthermore, President Zhelev is exploiting every convenient opportunity to make diplomatic gestures to the Russian leadership and to President Yeltsin in particular, so as to give them evidence of our feelings of goodwill.

In essence, President Zhelev instigated the NATO debate not so much because of the country's foreign policy as because of certain aims in the domestic policy field. Dr. Zhelev has already stated that he wants to outgrow the representative functions that the present Constitution accords to him and play a more decisive role in the country's politics. His desire for this to come about through an amendment to the Constitution and the acquisition of more powers by official means has miscarried in at least two instances. The first occurred at the time of his election to the Presidency in 1992, when he unsuccessfully applied to be granted the right to exercise a legislative initiative. The second occasion was quite recently, when almost all the political forces reacted violently to the hints dropped in his BBC interview concerning the advantages of a presidential republic. By making this statement he for the first time caused a unanimous reaction in the entire Bulgaria press, but the reaction was against to him. The Presidency hastened to nullify the effect of this gaffe by issuing a denial that he had said this.

However, in such cases denials have the opposite effect, and for this reason Dr. Zhelev quickly chose another path that despite everything might bring him closer to what he desires, namely to play a decisive role regarding important issues.

The president decided to intensify the debate on the subject of NATO so as to regain the halo of a supraparty, unifying center of power.

The adoption of the parliamentary declaration on association with NATO showed that the path he had chosen is a successful one, at least in a number of aspects. First, the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] was deprived of the opportunity to criticize him and was forced to come out in his support, despite its open hostility toward his person. Although the [SDS] headquarters at 134 Rakovski Street had always campaigned for Bulgaria to join NATO, the impression was now created that it was supporting the president's initiative. Second, Dr. Zhelev hinted to the right wing that he might be able to help in restoring the unity of action between the parliamentary partners that had fallen out with each other—the SDS and the DPS [Rights and Freedoms Movement], and that it was even possible for the "renegades" who had formed a separate parliamentary group to return to the fold. Third, the president demonstrated that he can win support for himself from the left as well, which is a message to the people of his intention to be an all-national, and not merely a "blue" [SDS] head of state.

Thus, directly preceding his traditional New Year message, President Zhelev ensured he has a good atmosphere for addressing his television speech to all his compatriots, with the accent on "all."

Chief Prosecutor Confirms Doynov's Arrest

AU2912132093 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] In connection with the doubts related to the arrest and detention of the defendant Ognyan Nakov Doynov [former Bulgarian communist leader and statesman] the Chief Prosecutor's Office announces that on 24 December 1993 it received from the Interpol Bureau at the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Sofia a copy of a report from Interpol-Vienna, which officially informs that the request of the Chief Prosecutor's Office of 1 October 1993 to render legal assistance in locating, arresting, and extraditing Ognyan Doynov, has been granted.

On the basis of decision No. 24-A 15,140 of 1993 of the Vienna Regional Court, on 9 December the Bulgarian citizen Ognyan Nakov Doynov was detained and placed under preliminary arrest.

The Chief Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Bulgaria will renew its request for the extradition of Ognyan Doynov.

Faces Embezzlement Charges

AU2912134693 Sofia BTA in English 1406 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Excerpts] Sofia, December 29 (BTA)—In connection with the detention of former Bulgarian political functionary Ognyan Nakov Doynov, the Bulgarian Prosecutor General's Office reports today it received a copy of an announcement of Interpol-Vienna from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, National Central Bureau-Interpol on December 24, 1993. It formally confirms that the Prosecutor General's Office request of October 1, 1993 for legal assistance (search, detention and extradition) was honoured. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria's Prosecutor General's office has charged Mr. Doynov with embezzling 20 million leva (U.S.$7 million according to the exchange rate of the time), which was donated to third-world communist regimes, parties and movements. Doynov may be sentenced to 10 to 30 years imprisonment.

Prosecutor Mikhail Doychev says 22 Communist Party functionaries and communist ministers were to be sued by the end of 1993 in the Bulgarian economic catastrophe trial. The embezzlement amounts differ from person to person. This summer Andrey Lukanov, Bulgaria's last communist prime minister after the ouster of Todor Zhivkov, was charged with embezzling 120 million leva. Aleksandur Lilov, the think-tank boss of the Bulgarian Socialist (ex-Communist) Party, was charged for 37 million leva. Todor Zhivkov is also among the 22, with 17 million leva. Zhivkov is being sued for U.S. $11.62 million in the same trial, referred to as the "Moscow" Fund because of the sending to Moscow of the funds to be distributed among communist-related movements worldwide.

Ognyan Doynov and former Deputy Prime Minister Stoyan Markov are the only absent defendants.

Plans To Sell Tamara Radar to Iran Denied

AU2912173893 Prague CTK in English 1538 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Excerpts] Prague, Dec 29 (CTK)—In connection with the reports published by U.S. media that the Czech Republic was going to sell Tamara radar to Iran, Director General of HTT Tesla Pardubice Ltd. Jiri Hron denied today that his company had asked for a license to export to Iran. [passage omitted]

"I can assure you that we are sensible enough to know what countries are entirely unacceptable as markets," Hron told CTK, and added that they would be bad manufacturers if they produced the goods just to be stored and did not try to sell them. He declined to specify possible customers.

Although Tamara is being currently used by the military since it is able to detect the "invisible" U.S. Stealth bomber, it could not be considered a weapon, Hron said. In his words, "it should be obligatorily used for the sake of improved trust between states, since it makes it possible to see everything going on in the airspace in a given region, and if someone has nothing to conceal, then he cannot object that his activities are known."

Tamara has uses other than military, since it could be used for the safety of sea traffic, Hron said. "We are trying to sell the device to the civilian sector so that it loses the reputation as a weapon it acquired two years ago," he added.

He stressed that Tamara was also of environmental importance since it did not radiate any electromagnetic energy and was not harmful to health.

Safire's comment was the second attack of this sort in the American press this year, Hron noted.

A Ministry of Trade and Industry official responsible for special material confirmed to CTK that no application for imports of Tamara to Iran had been submitted.

Army, Industry Officials Discuss Arms Projects

AU3012082093 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 28 Dec 93 pp 1, 16

["gag"-attributed report: "The Impatience of Thousands of Engineers"]

[Text] Prague/Adamov—The army welcomes the projects of the RDP Group consortium of Czech arms manufacturers on the modernization of the T-72 tank. It perceives them, more or less, as offers it will evaluate later, Deputy Defense Minister Kalousek told LIDOVE NOVINY. "So far, however, we are not able to tell what will be our orientation regarding the arms. Spending on the army is not guided by its existence, but rather by attaining the objectives of eliminating looming danger," the deputy minister summarized.

The soldiers are only able to define some priorities at this time. Allegedly, they, too, are troubled, like the industry, by an information vacuum. Therefore, in some regions, they cannot even define the assignment—what, when, and for how much. Although we know that we are going to need new weapons, we do not know when and how many," Kalousek adds. "We do not want to benefit from the fact that we associate 40 engineering companies with 200,000 highly qualified engineers and workers," RDP Group Director General Jan Vlcek says. "We know that the army will prefer first-class quality, which we can offer at a reasonable price." The director assumes that, in future, the army will acquire 10-15 percent of the RDP Group's output. This means that most of the products tested by the soldiers would go abroad. The thing is, even the most-advanced arms system is only a sample until it is tested by the army. In addition to substantial receipts for the state treasury resulting from exports of the reasonably priced quality arms systems (there are 6,500 aging T-72 tanks in the world outside the former USSR, and that is just one item), director Vlcek points out the supply of advanced Western technology.

The RDP Group is connected to the French conglomerate SOFMA. The cooperation with Western enterprises and implied standards and work culture therefrom also have their economic significance.

The army will be able, according to M. Kalousek, to define its priorities for the upcoming period in the middle of 1994, and only then it can deal—regardless of the lucrative offers—with the potential suppliers. The limited budget resources of the soldiers are also restrictive. The objections of industry representatives that they have already had three years to develop their concepts are not relevant, according to the deputy minister: "A new state emerged and its defense strategy is not identical with the Czechoslovak one. We are not closing ourselves to the Czech industry, we only ask for understanding." Communication with the enterprises will allegedly be conditioned by the benefit to the army.

Because of the type of our tanks and our limited means, there is no other way but to modernize the T-72, M. Kalousek admits. The realization of this project is described by the experts as an unprecedented cooperation of Czech industry.

Foreign Ministry on January NATO Summit

AU2912131893 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 27 Dec 93 p 3

[Unattributed report: "The NATO Summit Will Be Important Also for the Czech Republic"]

[Text] Prague—First Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Vondra received the heads of the diplomatic missions of the NATO-member states in Prague on 23 December. Taking this opportunity, he acknowledged the importance of NATO for maintaining European security and stability, and pointed out the demonstration of the imperial and nationalist tendencies in Europe. This was reported by Foreign Ministry spokesman Lucie Pilipova.

She said that Alexandr Vondra explained the stand of the Czech Republic with respect to the upcoming NATO

summit in Brussels, which, according to her, will be a significant event also for the European countries which are not members of this alliance.

The Czech side, according to Pilipova, is of the opinion that a prerequisite for the success of the NATO summit is, among other things, the confirmation of the openness of this organization, and its willingness to offer the prospect of its membership to the countries that will be ready for it.

Furthermore, Alexandr Vondra confirmed that the Czech Republic is getting ready for its participation in the Partnership for Peace program, which will form a firmer framework for the relations between the nonmember countries and the North Atlantic Alliance, and the approval of which is expected at the January NATO summit, Pilipova added.

Klaus Signs Administrative Reform Timetable

LD2912132393 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Today, Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus signed a timetable for legislative measures to implement territorial administrative reform in the Czech Republic.

After signing, the document was submitted to the secretariat of the Czech parliament.

Parliament had asked the Czech Government to prepare the timetable for implementing territorial administrative reform by 31 December at the latest.

Morovian Party Doubts Timetable

LD2912143293 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] The Free Democrats [SD] Party proposes that local elections and elections to higher territorial units representations be held simultaneously. The SD considers dubious an agreement on a timetable for the implementation of territorial administrative reform.

The SD sees the decision of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] Executive Council not to allow a second ODS regional council to be set up in Brno as a further sign of the deepening conflict within the ODS. According to the SD, the split within the ODS is irreversible and its leadership does not know what to do about it.

Prime Minister Klaus Reviews 1993

AU2912153693 Prague CTK in English 2134 GMT 28 Dec 93

[Text] Prague, Dec 28 (CTK)—Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus said tonight that the world "has not yet experienced, such a painless and calm currency separation like that of the Czechoslovak crown in February."

Reviewing the year 1993 on Czech Radio, Klaus also praised the way in which such complex issues as the future of the power plant being built at Temelin, south Bohemia, and the conflict with trade unions, were coped with.

Temelin has been heavily criticized by both domestic and foreign environmentalists and also by the Austrian Government. In the spring this year, the Czech Government decided to go ahead with Temelin's construction.

The conflict with unions was over wage regulation, pension extra premiums, and other questions. In spite of the differences of opinion, the government, employers and unions reached agreement on a draft "General Agreement" for 1994 on December 20. The agreement is concluded every year aiming to maintain social peace.

Klaus said the government was right in its estimates of the development of prices, unemployment, the state budget, etc.

According to him, the world evaluates as a tremendous success the fact that "a new Sarajevo, has not been produced by the division of Czechoslovakia. I think we have thus earned great trust," he added.

Parties Evaluate 1993 Political, Economic Events

AU2912195693 Prague CTK in English 1642 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Prague, Dec 29 (CTK)—The first year of the Czech Republic's existence is assessed positively by the government coalition parties, while the opposition takes the opposite view, a poll conducted by CTK among the parties revealed.

The coalition parties appreciate the peaceful and stable atmosphere of domestic developments, the popular support of reforms and policy of the coalition, the achievement of social harmony and the solidification of the Czech Republic's position on the international scene.

The opposition parties point to the decline in real income of the disadvantaged classes as well as to their worsened social position, to the stagnation of a number of industries, the declined economic performance of the state and increase in crime.

The communists reiterate their disapproving stance on the division of Czechoslovakia, which is considered by the Democratic Left Party to be anti-constitutional and a historic error, "for which both nations will pay in economic and human terms." The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) says that "Czechoslovakia's division occurred only in the interest of foreign and domestic power elites."

"The increased pressure by the right-wing and nationalist circles in Germany on the independent Czech Republic was the geopolitical consequence of Czechoslovakia's split," Jaroslav Ortman, deputy chairman of the Left Bloc Party, said.

Kovac Looks at Independence in New Year's Speech

AU2912195093 Prague CTK in English 1833 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Bratislava, Jan 1 (CTK)—"We can see nowadays that various catastrophic predictions, which Slovakia was supposedly unable to avoid, have not been fulfilled, though we do not deny that the new situation has also demanded certain sacrifices," Slovak President Michal Kovac said in his New Year speech delivered today.

"The calm and peaceful split of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic on January 1, 1993 proved a good starting point for a promising future," he added. A large number of sovereign states, including world powers, recognized Slovakia in a short time. They expressed their confidence in it and the Czech Republic, and took equal, accommodating stands toward both of them, Kovac said.

"The democratic constitution we have adopted is a fundamental guarantee of the civic rights and freedoms which were claimed by hundreds of thousands of people in November 1989 when the communist regime was toppled in Czechoslovakia. For the first time in our modern history we have become creators of our own destiny. We ourselves have decided to found our own state, which was requested, even dictated by historical developments."

Kovac added that it was necessary to build a state for all citizens regardless of their nationality or religious or political affiliation. He called upon all citizens to take part in promoting state democracy, observance of law, and responsibility: "We will do our best to defend our statehood, sovereignty, freedom, independence and territorial integrity."

He stressed he considered it important that neither the Slovak economy nor currency had collapsed after the split of the united economic area of the Czech lands and Slovakia. International surveys show that in most significant economic fields, Slovakia places second or third in comparison with other post-communist countries, Kovac stated.

"Despite all mistakes and existing serious problems, I can proudly state that Slovakia has held up in the first year of its state sovereignty," Kovac said. However, he stressed he was not satisfied with the achieved results, being convinced that they "could have been better, in both material and intellectual spheres."

"We have failed to learn to associate and unite political and non-political forces of society in order to jointly solve decisive problems. We did not look for mistakes in ourselves but others. Instead of seeking allies, we preferred to find adversaries and enemies to blame for everything.... Unfortunately, we failed to create a coalition to secure the needed stability of the government, or, at least, a constructive cooperation of political parties," Kovac said.

He stressed that capable and resolute individuals could not solve all Slovakia's problems. "We need a government of a broad coalition," he said, adding that personal clashes between leading politicians must not hamper creation of such a government.

Slovakia's problems can be solved only through cooperation among parliamentary parties, promotion of partnership, mutual confidence, peacefulness and consideration, not through confrontation, boasting, suspicions and accusations, or radicalization, Kovac stated. It is necessary that we, do away with our provisional and improvised government and try to attain political stability and a stable government which can also be trusted abroad, he said. Only thus can Slovakia focus on fighting unemployment, rising crime, disorder, lack of discipline and injustice, Kovac stressed.

Recalling that the United Nations has declared the year 1994 the year of the family, Kovac said that as the head of state, he would ask state bodies to help create a positive social climate for a peaceful and steady family life, including the creation of a state programme to support young families. He stressed that besides material welfare, human values such as mutual respect, love and consideration, were even more necessary for a "dignified and happy life."

"There is no substitute to doing good," Kovac said, adding that "mutuality, love, tolerance and generosity, are, besides democracy and freedom, the greatest treasure of every society." Kovac stated that it was impossible to expect any marked turn in 1994, especially in the economic area. "Although our economic situation is complicated, it is not hopeless. On the contrary, we have enough reasons to look ahead with realistic optimism," he said.

He underlined that Slovakia had high education level, as well as technology, and responsible and diligent people. Slovaks are learning modern management, business and foreign languages. On a large scale they can exploit international cooperation. "However, we lack healthy self-confidence," Kovac stated. He called on churches, cultural and educational institutions, media and teachers to do their best in this field.

At the close of his speech, Kovac greeted all Slovaks, including those living abroad, and wished them a happy 1994 and good health, optimism, unity and loyalty to each other and their country.

Finance Ministry: No Import Tax

AU2912165293 Prague CTK in English 1259 GMT 28 Dec 93

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 28 (CTK)—According to a decision by Slovak Deputy Premier Julius Toth, no import surcharge will be introduced in Slovakia in the near future. This follows from a statement today to CTK by the Slovak Finance Ministry. The ministry thus reacted to his [as received] state secretary Rudolf Autner saying

at a December 22 press conference that the approved 10 percent surcharge would take effect soon. The surcharge was to affect mostly Slovak foodstuffs and agricultural products which, at the moment, are not capable of competing with foreign products.

No Agreement in Minister's Talks With RFE

LD3012123093 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] No results—except for an agreement that the next meeting will take place in the second half of January—were achieved at a meeting between Roman Hofbauer, Slovak minister of transport, communications and public works, with Radio Free Europe officials.

The ministry terminated the contract with Radio Free Europe concerning rebroadcasts of RFE programs by medium-wave transmitters in Slovakia as of 31 January. According to Ivan Vaclavik, the ministry spokesman, the two parties agreed that for the sake of future dialogue they will make their differences public. Radio Free Europe continues to be interested in the medium-wave broadcasts. However, the ministry needs these frequencies for Slovak stations.

Party To Propose Hofbauer Resignation

AU2912174093 Prague CTK in English 1245 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 29 (CTK)—The Christian Democratic Movement will propose resignation of Slovak Minister of Transport, Communications and Civic Works Roman Hofbauer at the next parliamentary session, KDH Chairman Jan Carnogursky said in a statement given to CTK today. The statement gives as a reason for the move Hafbauer's bad performance which "culminated with the ministry's decision to terminate effective January 31, 1994, an agreement with Radio Free Europe to broadcast its programme in Slovakia by means of this country's radio transmitters."

"The KDH considers pluralism in policies towards the media to be a gain of the November 1989 revolution. Hofbauer's decision is a further step by the Slovak Government towards a return to the order of before November 1989," Carnogursky stresses. The agreement was made with the American side by the government of the former Czechoslovakia in 1990. The Slovak Ministry announced that the broadcasting of the programme of a foreign state through the transmitters of Slovak telecommunications contradicted Slovak legislation. The Slovak RFE broadcasts included comments critical of the current Slovak Government.

Conservative Democrats Call For New Elections

AU2912153793 Prague CTK in English 1347 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 29 (CTK)—Early parliamentary elections are the only way out of the current unflattering situation the Slovak society has found itself, Pavol Hagyari, chairman of the non-parliamentary Conservative Democratic Party (KDS), told journalists today.

He said he was convinced that now that the KDS had formed a coalition with the Democratic Party, also a non-parliamentary party, the established political entity stands a chance to become a parliamentary party and a stabilizing right-oriented factor on the Slovak political scene.

According to the KDS, what is of a key importance at present is to rapidly start the wave of bankruptcies and to make privatization process open to the general public. He said the current Slovak political representatives have created a "privatization vacuum," in which banks continue to subsidize large non-functioning state-owned enterprises, fearing the loss of enormous financial investment they have in these companies.

Hagyari said that the current government had brought Slovakia to the brink of poverty, and that "a day of settlement of accounts with it is approaching."

Envoy Views Problems in Relations With Czechs

AU2912195493 Prague CTK in English 1511 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 29 (CTK)—The division of the property of the former federation and the border question remain problems in Czech-Slovak relations, Ivan Mjartan, the Slovak ambassador to the Czech Republic, told Slovak radio today.

He said that the efforts to introduce a standard regime on the Czech-Slovak border arose under the pressure of the German asylum law, although the two countries' governing parties—Slovakia's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the Czech Republic's Civic Democratic Party (ODS)—had previously guaranteed a non-standard border to both Czech and Slovak citizens.

The biggest problem is the shift in citizens' thinking after the birth of the two independent states on January 1, 1993, Mjartan said.

He said that the Slovak Embassy in Prague still had neither its own residence nor a permanent seat. This depends, among other things, on how much money the embassy would receive for its operation, he added.

He stressed he did not consider that Czech-Slovak relations were cooling, although, he said, "it was possible to register a certain indifference on the part of some Czech politicians' towards Slovakia."

"I cannot imagine that.... two nations, which are so linguistically, culturally, socially and historically linked, would not cooperate," Mjartan concluded.

Andrejcak, U.S. Envoy Discuss NATO Summit

AU2912212093 Prague CTK in English 1929 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 29 (CTK)—The envisaged meeting of U.S. President Bill Clinton with representatives of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia proves that the Unites States supports cooperation between the Visegrad four countries, Slovak Defense Minister Imrich Andrejcak said today. "It is unnecessary to look for better evidence of its U.S. interest," Andrejcak said after his meeting with Theodor Russell, the U.S. ambassador to Slovakia.

Clinton and U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher are to meet with Visegrad four representatives on January 12 in Prague, immediately after the NATO summit (to be held in Brussels on January 10-11). At the meeting, Slovakia will be represented by President Michal Kovac and Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik.

Blazena Zimanova from the Slovak Defense Ministry's military information press agency quoted Andrejcak as saying that he had discussed with Russell the forthcoming NATO summit and Slovakia's stance toward the U.S. initiative "Partnership for Peace." Andrejcak also praised the operation of a contact team of the U.S. Army at the Slovak Defense Ministry, as well as activities carried out by Eleanor Sutter, charge d'affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Bratislava.

Natural Gas Prices To Increase 25 Percent

AU2912214093 Prague CTK in English 2035 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 29 (CTK)—The prices of natural gas for retailers will go up in Slovakia by a minimum 25 percent next year, Imrich Szitas from the Slovak Ministry of Economy told CTK today. The move has been prepared for a longer time but was shelved several times. The date when the prices would go up is not yet known, Szitas added. Retailers in Slovakia consume six billion cubic meters of gas a year. The share of natural gas in the overall annual energy consumption currently represents 25 percent and it is expected to grow to 35 percent in the course of the next 20 years. The Slovak gas industry will diversify its sources in the years to come, because it is now dependent at up to 96 percent on imports from Russia. The Slovak gas industry's prognoses expect gas pipelines to be interconnected so that the country might use sources from the North Sea and Algeria.

Interview Assesses Russian 'Danger,' NATO

AU2912181993 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 24 Dec 93 pp 1,10

[Interview with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky; Laszlo Kovacs, chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee and member of the Hungarian Socialist Party; Jozsef Szajer, member of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee and foreign affairs expert for the Federation of Young Democrats; and Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, member of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee and foreign affairs expert for the Alliance of Free Democrats, by Janos Avar and Gabor Lambert; place and date not given: "Russian Developments Are a Warning"]

[Text] After the Russian elections and before the launch of the domestic election campaign, MAGYAR NEMZET invited Geza Jeszenszky, Laszlo Kovacs, Jozsef Szajer, and Istvan Szent-Ivanyi for a discussion on foreign affairs. MAGYAR NEMZET was represented by chief correspondent Janos Avar and foreign policy editor Gabor Lambert.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Everyone in the East and the West will probably be forced by Russian election results to reevaluate foreign policy goals and possibilities. What kind of reevaluation would you consider necessary in Hungarian foreign policy? Is it possible that the emergence of a potential foreign danger will have a consensus-creating effect on domestic political forces?

[Jeszenszky] I do not believe that politics in Hungary need to be reassessed as a result of the Russian elections. In my view, Hungarian foreign politicians and the political parties have had a chance to become familiar with Russian politics and political forces in the past years and decades. Regardless of the fact that the actual results of the elections caused surprises and even alarm for many people, I would not think it wise to exaggerate their immediate effects. On the other hand, I believe that we always had to expect that such views existed, could appear, or become stronger, and Hungarian foreign policy has been aware of this.

[Szent-Ivanyi] I would not like to dramatize the situation, either. I think that what happened in Russia was to be expected. We need not expect the emergence of an immediate danger because the democratic forces are still in the majority, and a very strong presidential power has been established in Russia which is an effective break. In the short term and within the foreseeable future, the danger is not defined. Of course, [Russian Liberal Democratic Party Chairman Vladimir] Zhirinovskiy represents a very bad tendency and we must pay attention to this. In fact, not so much we, but Western Europe must pay attention to this. It has to be seen that if a common will to alleviate the burdens of the changes does not exist, then extreme, demagogic forces can very easily come to power or forge ahead and, in the case of Russia, in addition to violating the country's internal order and democracy, they can also mean a serious international threat. I hope that this warning signal will also be appraised at the NATO summit.

I believe that we do have a consensus in the most general aspects of security policy. This does not need to be changed and we need not make hysterical or panicky efforts under the influence of the Russian elections.

[Kovacs] I do not think that Russian foreign policy will change in the next one or two years. Rather, I sense a long-term negative tendency that is motored by the nostalgia for the world power position that was lost with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the intentions to regain these. However, if this forces Hungarian foreign policy to be reassessed after 1994, then this will be only one of the issues to be considered. It will also have to be assessed whether the United States will turn away from Europe, and what role the United States, now the only superpower, will play in international politics. The way the western world reacts to Central and Eastern Europe's integration efforts and security needs will be an important element of international conditions. Another important question is whether Russia will again try to become the second pole in world politics.

Finally, it will be important whether the Central and East European countries will be able to settle their differences between themselves because, without this, the integration efforts are doomed to failure. In my view, Hungarian foreign politics will have to have a scenario for these broad interconnections of international conditions.

[Szajer] In recent years, Hungarian foreign policy had the task of removing itself from the eastern sphere of interest. The reorganization took place with this in mind. No Hungarian foreign political leader will be able to ignore this fact in the future, either, because Russia is one of our neighbors, although not a direct neighbor. Another issue, namely Ukraine's independence follows here. In my view, Hungarian foreign policy was right in recognizing that it certainly had to make a definite step in this direction. Ukraine's independence might be one of the main obstacles to a possible future Russian imperial move or to the recapture of its sphere of interest.

Reaction to the Attacks

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Are we correct in saying that you agree that, as regards Hungary, there does not exist a direct and acute danger from the Russian election results?

[Szajer] With one addendum. I believe that this can have short-term effects on Russian foreign policy because it can exert a kind of populist pressure on the reform forces who are moving in this direction precisely to capture some of these voters.

[Kovacs] How NATO reacts to Central and East Europe's efforts and its security and membership needs after the Russian elections, is important. Two kinds of effects can exist, one is that we should be more cautious and not irritate Russia and not play into the hands of the extremist forces. The other is that they will say: Considering that we will have to face an expansive Russian foreign policy in the near future or somewhat later, we

should strengthen our positions in the region. Considering the western way of thinking, I think that the latter version is less likely.

[Jeszenszky] I think that we will need to talk a little more about this. However, in connection with Zhirinovskiy's success it has to be said that this should not have surprised the world or Hungarian society because, unfortunately, the Zhirinovkiy way of thinking is present in our region. Its traces might even exist in Hungary, but we have been able to see these elements in the attitude of some of our neighbors for a long time and this is what makes it difficult to improve or settle our relations to the extent our government has intended to since it was formed. However, the Russian elections and the strengthening of these tendencies might have an effect on the neighbors, rather than on Hungarian domestic politics. It is possible that some of our neighbors are even more afraid of nationalist Russian politics than we are.

[Szent-Ivanyi] What was said by Szajer can be a very true hypothesis. Many arguments can be found to support the assumption that Russian foreign politics will take an expansionist turn under nationalist pressure, in effect start a race with its own nationalist opposition. However, the opposite is also possible, namely that it will define itself in opposition to nationalist pressure. It is also a possibility that Western Europe will suggest to the Russian leadership that this is the big opportunity. Now President Yeltsin can prove that he is committed to democratic values and will not enter this race.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] To remain with the issue of consensus, let us ask Foreign Minister Jeszenszky's views on the attacks on his person when the new government was formed? As these were rooted in a concrete foreign political issue, namely the ratification of the basic agreement with Ukraine (also voted for by the opposition parties), what are the views of the others on the situation?

[Jeszenszky] In my view, the only person who does not get attacked is the one who does not do anything. I accepted responsibility at that time, too. This was a manifestation of responsible politics and I believe that people who, because of this, think that a different foreign minister is needed, should consider whether it is good for us to have Ukraine as a partner and a neighbor—or they would like another neighbor.

[Szajer] As to Ukraine, I would also add that a similar "surprise" to the Russia events can also be expected in Ukraine where elections are forthcoming. From this point of view, it is good that we already have a signed agreement that can be used as a basis in some way.

[Kovacs] I rather regularly criticized Hungarian foreign politics in the past three and a half years but the signing of the Hungarian-Ukrainian agreement was one of the successes of Hungarian foreign politics. This agreement greatly strengthened Hungary's security. I believe that the minister was also attacked for his Romanian visit. It is unfortunate that Jeszenszky is attacked for things that can actually be seen as the positive results of Hungarian foreign policy in the past few years.

[Szent-Ivanyi] Let me add something as this agreement is still being criticized by many people today because the agreement on the protection of national minorities, which is a supplement to the document, has only barely been implemented. However, this cannot influence our conviction that this accord had to be made, for two reasons. On one hand, we do not know what would have happened without this agreement. It is very likely that even the few rights that we managed to achieve would not have been granted. This agreement can always be referred to in bilateral relations and before the international organizations. In a certain sense, it is an example and forms a model for the time when we will have partners who approach this issue with much more toleration.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Therefore, we can also say that the demand to replace the foreign minister would have had a foreign political significance much outweighing its personal aspects.

[Kovacs] It would have been a very bad indication if the new government had accepted this demand. It would have had a negative effect on the whole image of Hungary's foreign politics.

[Szent-Ivanyi, Szajer] We believe we can agree with this.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Let us turn to another issue. The western organizations that we wish to join almost go as far as stipulating harmonious relations with our neighbors as a condition for membership. What are our tasks in this area?

[Szent-Ivanyi] The biggest mistake would be either by the government or the opposition to give the impression that these problems can be solved in the short term. The next government should state that these problems cannot be solved in the short term even if both sides have the utmost goodwill. We can only promise that we will get closer to the solution year by year and step by step.

[Kovacs] It is a fact that the West expects relations to be settled between the various countries in this region. In my view, this is a perfectly natural demand on their part because which club would welcome two members who are antagonistic to each other. This region can expect that if it cannot settle its conflicts between the states then the whole region will be left out of the integration whose current members do not have much willingness to accept new members, anyway. In my view, the improvement of Hungary's relations with its neighbors, making some kind of compromise and peace with the three countries with which our relations are tense for various reasons at the moment, is unavoidable. We cannot give this up and not only because it would spoil our chances for admission to the western institutions of integration—Hungary's security also largely depends on the quality of its relations with its neighbors.

[Jeszenszky] Referring to the unhappy fate of the fighting peoples along the Danube, [20th-century poet] Ady feared that "this would never change, this is how it was ordained," but I hope that it is not necessary for the relations of Central and East European people to be the way they are.

From the time the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] formulated its foreign policy program in 1989—and I do not think the opposition parties' program was different, either—it has been consistently trying to establish honestly and in good faith a different kind of relationship and jointly eliminate the communist heritage. The Visegrad cooperation—that is not entirely doomed yet—shows that this was not completely impossible. At any rate, it would have been possible to give a totally different direction to Central European politics with the Romanian emigrant politicians with whom the MDF signed a statement in the summer of 1989 (and which the Federation of Young Democrats, FIDESZ, and the Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ, also joined).

I believe that the view that lumps Hungary and its neighbors together and makes them equally responsible when they cannot agree, is not honest and is unfortunate. If one were to look at these disputes a little closer one can only conclude that Hungary is right. Our western partners, including the members of the Council of Europe, also have their share of responsibility for not insisting more strictly on the correct principles that could have made cooperation smoother and better. In that case, the Hungarian national minorities and more tolerant politics toward national minorities would at least have a better chance on a legislative level.

The Issue of the Basic Agreement

[MAGYAR NEMZET] As far as we know, at the weekend, Gyula Horn [chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP] urged a basic agreement with Slovakia and he actually promised this if his party is successful at the elections. The question arises how realistic it is to complete a basic agreement with Slovakia and/or Romania next year?

[Kovacs] We do not think that Hungary cannot have very good relations with any of its neighboring countries without a basic agreement, but it has to be noticed that those of our neighbors with whom relations are tense are clinging to the basic agreement and find it emphatically important. In my view, a good basic agreement is not at all disadvantageous for Hungary. The example of the Hungarian-Ukrainian agreement proved this. The next government can set itself the task of making the basic agreements as soon as possible. However, I cannot imagine any basic agreement that would not include the two issues that can be a source of conflicts in this region. One is the issue of the borders and the other is the rights of the national minorities. These have to be in any basic agreement if either of the sides require it. As these neighbors require that the basic agreements include the border issue, Hungarian foreign politics has no reason to evade this. Hungary on the other hand requires that the implementation of national minority rights according to European norms be included in these agreements. I am convinced that none of our neighbors have an acceptable reason to evade this.

[Szajer] I would approach the issue from a different angle. The basic agreement can be the framework of a cooperation that already exists in some form from the past. Therefore, the restoration of economic links and trust is needed first. I completely agree with Szent-Ivanyi: We need to put a lot of energy and work into building these and the final result can be a basic agreement. Many symbolic relations are linked to the border issue and the national minority issue and stirring them up could cause unnecessary conflicts. The basic agreement can be placed on top of the more or less completed edifice when the conditions are ripe. When this kind of agreement is possible then I think Hungarian foreign politics will have to do this.

[Jeszenszky] I am glad that Szajer, obviously unintentionally, used the same parallel as I did at my talks with Romanian Foreign Minister Melescanu in Gyula, namely that the basic agreement is the top of a building, or if you like, the statement on the borders is also the crowning of an agreement. At any rate, it is not our supposed intention to revise the borders that hinders the basic agreements. We have included such agreements in our program and we make them with those who are ready for it; we have done this with a number of countries, neighbors and others, and the guaranteeing of national minority rights is included in them in all cases. We could have had an agreement with Slovakia, or rather with the former Czechoslovakia, long ago; we held discussions on it at the same time we negotiated with Poland and we actually signed the bilateral agreement with Poland at the Visegrad summit in Krakow in October 1991. The borders were drawn and signed in 1920 and 1947 and the Hungarian Parliament ratified these. The problem is and the reason we do not have agreements with our neighbors is that their willingness to settle the situation of the Hungarian minority is missing, and in their legislation and in their practice, the elements that were part of international law between the two world wars, are missing. Therefore, we are not demanding anything new, we want the restoration and guaranteeing of an old legal status.

[Szent-Ivanyi] In my view, the basic agreement is a means rather than an end. It makes sense if it can contribute to alleviating or resolving conflicts between two countries. The basic agreement makes sense if both sides have an honest intention to find compromises in the disputed issues. If the partner is unwilling to make an agreement in any other way then it has to be concluded that relations between these two countries have not matured for making a basic agreement. Even in this case, there are alternatives and many things can be done, for example, Jeszenszky signed three important agreements with Romania although a basic agreement cannot now be made with Romania. However, it is indeed one of the most serious failures or Hungarian diplomacy and Hungarian foreign politics that important western partners several times have asked and it is also often printed in the western press that, according to all this, Hungary

wants territorial changes and Hungary does not unequivocally stand by the principles of the inviolability of borders.

In practice, a defensive stance is taken, we have not managed to make it clear and unequivocal that Hungary is not seeking the solution to the national minority issue through changing the borders. We must make it clear for our European partners that it will not at all be up to us if the basic agreements are not made; we want these agreements and, as far as the SZDSZ is concerned, will also do so in the future. Unfortunately, the former impermissible and ambiguous statements of government party members also played a role. I am thinking of [former state secretary] Erno Raffay's utterances, Istvan Csurka's [head of the Hungarian Life and Justice Party] repeated statements, or of [parliamentary deputy] Izabella B. Kiraly. These people no longer belong to the government party, and naturally there is no place for this in the government's official statements, but unfortunately it has to be seen that when ambiguous signals are given from the government party then these will be misunderstood.

[Jeszenszky] It is not only because Szent-Ivanyi spoke rather sharply about the failure of Hungarian foreign policy that I do not agree with him. I do not agree that Raffay had said anything our neighbors could justifiably have objected to. However, some people will seize every opportunity to discredit and slander Hungary. Csurka's statements were unfortunate because they gave ammunition to these. Up to then it had only been possible to attribute such intention to the Hungarian government—which had never had any basis - by using sentences out of their context. Of course, it would be an exaggeration to turn the statements of one or two people into demons as was done by certain observers by enlarging their significance, and it is unfounded to believe that Hungary's image radically changed as a result of this. However, rather than these criticisms that are sometimes also amplified by the opposition, the south Slav crisis is the most important reason our region and our debates are viewed with concern by many people. Its horrors have frightened the western world and while in the past they saw the national minority problem as an issue to be settled—and they were not very much troubled by Hungary's relations with its neighbors—now they are afraid that similar conflicts may also break out in other places. They are not searching for the reasons, all they are interested in is preventing or foiling them by all means.

[Kovacs] I would like to react to Jeszenszky's remark that the border issue is not a problem. Unfortunately, in bilateral relations, one side's problem is always both sides' problem. This has to be accepted. We cannot do the same what the politicians of some neighboring countries do when they say that the national minorities are feeling comfortable in their countries. The credible thing would be for the national minorities themselves to state this.

[Szajer] It is not certain that we have opposition versus government on all issues. However, all kinds of foreign policies have to bear in mind how their action or inaction and various gestures will be interpreted abroad. The government can be blamed for ignoring this fact. Even if a certain oversensitivity can be seen in connection with this region because of the south Slav crisis. However, I believe that the Hungarian government has not made ambiguous statements. Consequently, the problem lies in its influence on forming the image of its attitude, rather than its attitude itself.

Shall We Strike While It Is Hot?

[MAGYAR NEMZET] The NATO summit where the offer of partnership will also be discussed will be in January. However, in light of Russian developments, many people in the West would go further and are urging more concrete security guarantees for Eastern Europe, but at least for Central Europe. In your view, has a situation arisen where it is worth striking while the iron is hot, and if it has then what are our means for this?

[Jeszenszky] It is not we who should be striking just now, we need more refined methods. Now we are waiting for the United States, Canada, and the European Union to give us an answer that will give a perspective on Hungary and this region. As a matter of fact, the European Union has done this through the Copenhagen statement. NATO has not yet made this step although it has made a very important step towards it. The "Partnership for Peace" plan is meant to symbolize this opening. It is too early to say whether January will be NATO's Copenhagen or if we have to wait for another round. However, I believe that this is the direction we must take and partnership in peace is a good beginning. I do not think that moderation would isolate anyone; rather, it is a serious encouragement and incentive to take the measures that other countries have already taken, arrive at their goals, and be given security, this can then give an incentive to the countries further away or further to the east to proceed more quickly.

[Szent-Ivanyi] I do not expect a dramatic change at the NATO summit in January; I think that the really important issues in January will not be in connection with us. It is very likely that relations between the West European Union [WEU] and NATO will be rearranged, therefore, the WEU can become NATO's European pillar, thus providing Europe with armed forces that can be deployed and operated. Naturally, by Europe I mean Western Europe. As regards Eastern Europe, practically nothing can be expected. Only a statement that—perhaps in the distant future—offers without conditions a future chance of membership without precisely defining it. This is a very small move. The U.S. proposal called "Partnership in Peace" seems to be more important. It is a new and very small step, and a beginning we would definitely like to transcend. It would be very important that the bilateral agreements with the various countries have different contents, almost everything depends on this. So that those are accepted faster who themselves can offer more (for example, the commitment of armed forces to participate in joint actions, and so on). Therefore, this is where something can be expected: If we reach the point that agreements with

different contents are made with Hungary and Kazakhstan, the Czech Republic and Kyrgyzstan, then we will have made the first step.

I hope that this much at least will happen. From Hungary's point of view, the main point is to form close, viable, and real cooperation with NATO. A cooperation that, through its existence, means additional security—I hardly dare say—guarantees, or at any rate, a factor that increases security for Hungary. This way, it will be increasingly clearer—through planning joint military exercises or forming joint policies—that Hungary is part of the western world, regardless of whether it is given formal membership. In this, there is a difference between the views of the SZDSZ and the MSZP but I think that the other parties agree on this issue. The MSZP's views excluded selective membership and claim that membership only makes sense if the region's countries join together, or at least on the level of associate membership, they join together.

[Kovacs] Naturally, the MSZP cannot say that it excludes or rejects a selective handling of the region because the MSZP does not have any influence on this, it will be decided by NATO. We are saying that, as mutuality is one of the basic elements of security, stability would be brought about in the region if all its countries—and I am naturally not thinking of Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan—were given the same security guarantees by NATO, and they would all feel the same sense of security. In my view, it is of secondary importance whether this is an institutionalized guarantee including perhaps full membership or some form of a declared guarantee. I do not like Hungarian foreign policy emphasizing that we should be admitted because we are already ripe for NATO membership and suggesting that our neighbors are not mature. This only leads to uncertainty and further tensions.

[Szajer] The question mentioned our approach to two integrations. I would positively say that we definitely have to perceive our integration in NATO and the European Union as one and the same process. Therefore, the main element of our attitude should be the declaration of the fact of rapprochement rather than setting time limits. Naturally, this process has to end in membership because it seems that, apart than NATO, there are no other organizations providing security guarantees. The situation is the same in the case of linking with the European Union, therefore, the diplomatic possibilities have to be utilized whenever possible and as soon as possible. The key question is to what extent we will be able to become compatible although I believe that we will also need external help for this. In the case of European Union membership, it is necessary to fulfill the condition of membership, which includes the legal system, harmonizing the economic systems, and so on. Naturally, this is not only a foreign political issue.

[Jeszenszky] If I understood Kovacs correctly, he does not consider it realistic or desirable for Hungary and some countries to become NATO members before, for example, Romania.

[Kovacs] Hungary should not be a NATO member before Romania or Slovakia, and I do not consider the opposite of this desirable, either, because this would create new tensions. In fact, there is a danger that selective admission to NATO would push the excluded countries toward Russia!

[Jeszenszky] This is not at all certain. It would, rather, be an incentive, and Hungary's NATO membership cannot threaten anyone. Naturally, I also find it desirable for all our neighbors to be NATO members, but I would not wait until all are "matured;" I would rather agree with the pessimistic views and say that some of our neighbors have to travel a longer distance than we do and I do not wish to wait for them. Just as in the European Union, moderation should prevail and we must not accept this being seen as an antagonistic step because NATO is a defense organization. For this reason, we also have to argue with the view that NATO's extension to the East would isolate Russia or would even threaten it.

[Kovacs] Let us not misunderstand: I am not saying that selectivity would not be a good idea in the case of the European Union because I find it perfectly natural that only a country that is ready for this can be a member of the European Union. However, the issue of NATO membership is not a question of maturity, rather, it is a matter of strategic considerations. For example, Turkey has been a NATO member for decades but still is not a member of the European Union.

[Szajer] We very often hear from the West that they do not want to let these countries join NATO because they are worried about a Russian reorganization and the advancement of the Russian conservative right wing. I am hoping that this is only an excuse on their part and not a serious statement of the fact that Russia again has some kind of right of veto on what the countries in this regions do.

Horn Calls For Autonomy for Minority in Slovakia

AU2912211093 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 28 Dec 93 p 5

[Interview with Hungarian Socialist Party Chairman Gyula Horn by Ivan Vilcek; place and date not given: "Nationalism Poses a Threat to the World's Security"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Vilcek] The autonomy of the Hungarian minority has become a topical issue in Slovakia. What is your opinion on this sensitive problem of Slovak-Hungarian relations?

[Horn] We are supporters of linguistic, cultural, and self-governing autonomy [samospravna autonomie]. The demands of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia are in complete harmony with the recommendations of the Council of Europe. I am convinced that the Hungarian minority in Slovakia does not want to change the state borders, and wants to live in harmony and friendship with the Slovak nation. Unfortunately, bad politicians are trying to use the minorities' problems to achieve their objectives. [passage omitted]

Prime Minister Addresses Sejm on Economy

LD2912133093 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0818 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Speech by Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak to Polish Sejm in Warsaw—live]

[Text] Mr. Speaker! May it please the House. Ladies and gentlemen. We are meeting in the last days of 1993. We are now summing up the experiences of the passing year, and also the experiences of the past 45 years, as well as the past 4 and one-half. This is because we are present in this chamber thanks to the processes which began in the memorable June of 1989. We want to sum up experiences which were full of joy and good, but also those which were painful and difficult. Poland's present has its roots in all these experiences.

Politicians' emotions focus today on the activities of the government. It is hardly surprising. The parties in the present government coalition have negated many measures of their predecessors. Today they are in the position of having to continue with these measures, particularly in some areas. This creates opportunities for various comments. Why are we doing this? If a car is in motion and running toward an abyss at a great speed—and the simple continuation of the previous policy course constitutes such a fast movement in the direction of an abyss of social conflicts—only a bad driver stamps on the brakes violently or swerves suddenly to the left or right. The strategy of the present government is to gradually brake and to gradually start new engines which will allow us to steer clear of the abyss and reach the set target in good shape, without changing the main course.

This strategy does not fully satisfy either the left or the right. They both want a sharp turn. What is more, it does not meet with loud support from even among those who know that this strategy is correct, but who regret that they were not able to produce such a strategy themselves.

Those who are impatient are concerned, even among the rank and file party members who have formed our government. However, may it please the house, for today this is the most sensible strategy, although it is not the only possible strategy. The real entrepreneurs and good managers—farmers who know that even the best seeds sown in the fall bear fruit only in summer—know this.

Mr. Speaker, may it please the house. Everyone in Poland has their own criteria for assessing the state of the country and its economy. From the viewpoint of every family this is assessed by using the structure of the household budget as a point of reference: what payments and purchases each family can afford. From the point of a particular enterprise this is assessed against the condition of the company: if after paying taxes the enterprise can still develop and is not in debt, we assess its condition as good.

We all balance our incomes and expenditure and plan our course of action. The reality which we have to face in 1994 is determined by the entire social and economic situation. It is true that the national product increased in 1993—it will be over 4 percent higher than in 1992. Industrial output will be higher by about 7 percent. Signs of economic growth were noted in the first quarter of 1992. The fastest pace of development was noted in the second half of 1992.

However, the signs of recovery in 1993 were not permanent and do not have the so-called healthy roots. They are accompanied by such phenomena as a drop in the number of zloty deposits among the economic entities and a large increase in the difference between enterprises' obligations and amounts due [Towarzysza in bowiem takie zjawiska jak spadek depozytow zlotowych podmiotow gospodarczych I olbrzymi wzrost nadwyzki zobowiazan nad naleznosciami przedsiebiorstw.]

The threat to economic stability today is not 4 percent inflation in November. Two other phenomena have particularly dramatic effects. The first is the foreign trade deficit. Since July 1992 there has been a constant trend of a worsening foreign trade balance in Poland. Whereas the balance of turnover in July 1992 amounted to a $1 trillion surplus, at the end of 1992 it had decreased considerably and we will have a deficit of about $2.5 billion at the end of 1993.

The second phenomena which shows the scope of difficulties of our government is the debt. The main chunk of this debt is foreign debt. It amounts to over 1 quintillion zloty at the end of 1993. The national debt in the National Bank of Poland [NBP] and in commercial banks already amounts to 360 trillion zloty. The servicing of this debt will become a significant burden in 1994.

We know that negotiations to reduce the foreign debt are in progress. However, one has to remember that such debt reduction means that the part of the foreign debt which was not reduced will have to be recovered. We plan that the cost of this debt service will amount to around 30 trillion zloty in 1994. The recovery of the internal debt, which amounted to 11 percent of the GNP in 1990 and 23 per cent in 1993, will next year amount to 82 trillion zloty. This is similar amount to the entire planned budget deficit in the budget planned for 1994.

The servicing of the whole public debt will amount to 16 percent of all budget expenditure. This means that we can earmark only 84 percent of the budget income for the needs of the various state economic sectors in 1994.

This is the state of the country's finances which the government is taking over and with which it is entering 1994.

Ladies and gentlemen, you will today receive the draft state budget for 1994. At an appropriate moment we shall acquaint you with this budget. Today, I want to focus your attention on general issues which determine the state of the country and its prospects, not for one year but for many years.

May it please the House. Does our country, a country which is in the process of transforming its political system, which is in debt, and which has to make initial corrections to its policy course on the scale of the coming year, have any development prospects? As prime minister in a government which has devoted almost the entire time of its two months' long activity so far to the finances and the economy, I shall answer this question in social terms. Yes, our country does have such a chance for development, provided it can find enough strength to introduce healing measures, at every level and in every area, provided the arguments and accusations are replaced by joint searches for the best solutions, and provided we are able to accept the concept that there is no contradiction of objectives between the central and local government authorities.

Having applied this method of reasoning we introduced the principle of the voluntary local government takeover of joint co- responsibility for important spheres of society's life. This is not the centralization of power, but this is also not passing responsibility on to the local governments centrally either.

The division of joint responsibility will enable the government to concentrate on creating conditions for the development of entrepreneurship and good management among all members of society. I have in mind not only a lasting economic system, for example a stable and wise system of customs duties and sensible taxation. We have made certain decisions on these matters. One cannot always reverse incorrect solutions in a short period of time. The esteemed House has already examined a number of bills.

We are also building new relations. We want to establish such relations between employers and employees whereby workers feel responsible for the enterprise for which they work, and whereby employers feel responsible for the fate of their employees. The difficulties for the government are not only of an economic and political nature. They also have a cultural dimension. It is no longer important today what caused us to waste the uniting of Poles by Solidarity, that subsequent preferences for unemployment and social security benefits took the place of wage increases for good work, and that privatization, which was to provide a lever to develop the economy, has turned into a doctrinal measure, which turns into an assumption of the belief that private ownership in its nature must be more efficient than other forms of ownership.

Social trust toward political elites disappeared as a result of many disappointments and failures. Also important are some elements of the situation during which the government took over. That is why the program of relying on initiative and good housekeeping by all Poles which was expressed earlier must be supplemented by a dramatic question: What motives should guide our nation in undertaking an effort equal to that of our ancestors, who by positive work built their state or rebuilt it after the war.

Mr. Speaker, may it please the House, With government's efforts, 1994 could be envisaged as the year when most negative processes will be stopped. However, by implementing this program today, in the last days of 1993, we must think not only of how to increase the budget income, but also about how to lower prices and how to have a decent life on salaries which are lower than in many other countries.

All states which have found ways to keep apace with the world leaders in the last decades earlier found areas in which they were becoming the best and in which they were producing good cheaper than in highly developed countries. Can our economy do this? Can the private and state businesses do this? I am aiming this particularly at private businessmen. Ideological belief that the private sector on its own is always better than others is exhausted. Now we have to prove that this sector can point Poland toward other aims.

Here the government declares two things. Even at the expense of implementing a solution which it does not like, the government will ensure economic stability within the country, and that together with the representation of economic spheres it is ready to work on the dynamic program of the country's development, which would be accepted by businessmen and society.

May it please the House. We can talk about various macro-relations, inflation, and a deficit, but we can also show other relations illustrating our situation. This simple fact indicates the scope of unemployment and the consequences of carrying on social security payments in areas particularly threatened by unemployment, decisions made yesterday, which amount to figures which would, for example, solve most of the problems of the arms industry. One may see changes in the economic structure when a change from miners' guilds to holdings is leaving us with a debt of about 30 trillion zloty.

We could look at the situation of agriculture and crafts—how much experience and good examples of proper and honest entrepreneurship have been wasted. [applause]

During these few years a great change of values and priorities has occurred in the area of economic management. Today most employees, that is over 60 percent, work in the private sector. At the same time, this sector of the economy provides less than 50 percent of the national income. These figures illustrate both the pace of our transformations and their weakness and low effectiveness.

The programs being implemented in Poland, a country of 40 million people, were very bold programs and were implemented with courage. Their results in terms of quantity may be surprising even to the authors of the programs. However, in terms of effectiveness these results are surprisingly poor.

The income accrued by the privatization process amounts to $167 million in 1991, in 1992 to $360 million, and in 1993 it will come to around $411 million. This income, sufficient to build one large work enterprise, constitutes

only one small part of what should have remained in the budget. This is caused by many factors. To assess it most liberally, this was caused by so-called underestimates. We can learn about the scale of these errors in estimating by using the example of 1993 when record underestimating allowed the people who purchased shares to multiply their capital by a factor of 14.

Of course, the development of a capital market is important because of the country's future, but one must remember that the capital market, the stock exchange, and banks are institutions which provide a service to the economy, that they are institutions where redistribution of income occurs, and that the multiplying of income takes place primarily in the manufacturing sector. Not being aware of this truth leads to degeneration and, consequently, to crises. We are now experiencing Such a crisis in Poland, where on the one hand, capital based institutions are being developed, and on the other hand, the economy is being ruined.

We must reinstate a balanced economy in Poland, so that knowledge and work take priority over capital. Speculation and games are elements of a free market economy, but when they start to dominate, it is no longer a free market but a lottery. In a civilized country we have an obligation to look after the interests of all society and not only some selected groups, however active they may be. The systemic solutions and market principles make some people progress fast but plunge others into poverty. This often depends on where someone is at the moment when a new wave of history arrives, whether he works for a better or worse enterprise, and in which sector of the economy.

People often fail because of destiny or by chance and not because of a lack of entrepreneurship. Others fail because they observe the rules but are faced by people without principles and morals. In building a healthy society the state must notice such phenomena so that it can maintain the strength of the zloty and economic progress, while on the other hand it has to create conditions for honest and legal money making, spending, and investing. It also has to help out those who cannot individually maintain pace with historical changes. Of course the point is not to give charity to the poor but to create conditions and situations, work places and opportunities, so that they can themselves improve their own situation.

Ladies and gentlemen, these are the problems and challenges which are facing us—the government, Sejm, and society. Let us hope that 1994 will bring many solutions and achievements so that the sacrifices made so far are not wasted, and that our knowledge, our work, and our experiences are satisfactory and lead us to success.

Walesa on Joining NATO, Role of Army

LD2912171593 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1600 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] At today's New Year's meeting in the Navy headquarters at Oksywie base, President Lech Walesa said: We had many political problems, conflicts and disagreements but the army has been above the divisions and served the homeland. That is why I wish to thank them for it.

[Correspondent Piotr Swiac] At a news conference President Lech Walesa said, among other things: The army is one of the pillars of every country and its budget should be determined more than just one year ahead. I will do everything to help the army, Lech Walesa said. He also commented on the issue of Poland joining NATO: The first success—the dissolution of the Warsaw treaty—was enough for the West. For Poland this is much too little. [video shows Walesa reviewing the honor guard on the quayside; Walesa and Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk on board a naval vessel "Warszawa"]

News Conference Reported

LD2912221793 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2100 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] At a news conference in Gdynia on board the navy flagship ORP Warszawa President Lech Walesa stressed that more attention than hitherto should be devoted to the security of the state and the armed forces and that more funds should be set aside for this purpose.

According to Walesa, the way things have been done so far was imprudent but could be accepted in times of peace such as those during which political transformations in Europe have been taking place. Since there are now dangers we cannot go on acting in this way. If we do not respect our own army perhaps we shall be forced to respect another's army, the president said.

Referring to the situation in Russia he said that he does not fear aggression by that country since for Russia itself this would not be worth it becauser Poland is too small a morsel for it. Assessing within this context the West's grudging stand on the acceptance of Poland into NATO he stressed that it is rather Western Europe and the United States who should take into consideration such a scenario and, in their own interests, take care to broaden the zone of joint security.

At the same time Lech Walesa called the Zhirinovskiy case nothing but a hygienic symptom. Continuing this thought he said: Sometimes dangerous cases can lead to an improvement in security.

Foreign Minister Argues for NATO Membership

WS3012103093 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 29 Dec 93 pp 1, 22

[Article by Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski: "How To Leave Security Gray Area; Poland Wants To Be in NATO"]

[Text] Two world wars and the period of the Cold War have demonstrated clearly the enormous significance for European security of the active involvement and leadership of the United States. A change in this policy—or even the mere suspicion that it could occur—would set in

motion some processes which would bring about enormously significant consequences. These would have a particular impact on Poland, a country positioned between two European powers: Germany and Russia.

We were happy to hear an announcement made by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher that during the NATO summit meeting in January "President Clinton will present his vision of transatlantic security and prosperity, and he will also recall the strong, unbreakable ties between the United States and Europe." We urge that Poland and the remaining members of the Visegrad Group, as well as Central Europe as a whole, be included in that vision of Europe.

Central Europe currently constitutes a "security vacuum."

Christopher called Central Europe a "security and stabilization vacuum." Life does not tolerate vacuums. So a question arises: Who will fill it, and when and how?

This is exactly the context in which one should view our efforts to strengthen our relations with the United States, as well as with institutions responsible for the West's security.

A new world order is being born. The United States is one of its leading architects. Poland wants to secure a safe place for itself within that order, in accordance with its own choice. It is an historical task for us.

There are some who would like to see us in a "gray area." Such suggestions are not only contrary to our aspirations, but they are also outright dangerous. If it were to be in the "gray area," Poland would constitute an incentive for competition or conspiracy between powerful neighbors. As Italians are used to saying: "You should not tempt saints, especially those who are not saints at all." These are not unjustified fears. After all, we cannot ignore the election results achieved by Zhirinovskiy in Russia. In his program, he postulated a reconstruction of the Soviet empire. Taking into account the number of votes he received, we cannot afford to regard what he said as merely a bad joke.

Placing Poland in the "gray area" would prevent it from playing an important stabilizing function in the region. A stable internal situation, state borders which are not questioned by anyone, as well as an exemplary treatment of ethnic minorities—all these make it possible for our country to become an "exporter of stabilization" in a region where such stabilization is not an easily accessible commodity.

We actively support cooperation within the framework of initiatives such as the Visegrad Group, the Central European Initiative, or the Baltic States Council. Within the framework of the CSCE as well as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, we have been significantly contributing to the building of a wide security area stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. A feeling of being in the "gray area" and the resultant external pressures would greatly limit our contribution.

It is therefore very important that Poland not be left alone and that it not become a country in the "gray area." Poland must be tied to Western institutions: the European Union, the Western European Union, and NATO. Acceptance by these institutions of a dynamic country of 40 million people will make them stronger and it will also contribute to maintaining the values and goals they profess. A rejection of Polish efforts to become a member of NATO would push the country into an area of destabilization and conflict. We cannot allow that to happen.

Poland's Joining NATO Must Be a Process

It is beyond any dispute that any country joining NATO cannot happen overnight, and that it must be part of a process. One can imagine a great many versions of such a process and some of them have already been presented. Among them are programs by two such prominent politic scientists as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Today however, the most significant are the principles contained in an initiative by President Clinton which has been described as the "Partnership for Peace." The initiative will meet our needs and will be supported by us if it provides an opportunity for NATO membership to partners such as Poland, which share the alliance's goals and values and which are ready to actively bear co- responsibility for their implementation in practice. Toward that goal, "Partnership for Peace" should define five elements which would constitute a "plan" leading to membership in NATO.

First, among the goals of "Partnership for Peace" (aside from others which have already been spelled out) should be a gradual widening of the alliance. Concerned countries should be presented with clear visions of the future in that regard, while programs of cooperation with those countries should be geared toward their future NATO membership.

Second, "Partnership for Peace" should define requirements and rules of behavior in the political and military areas.

So, the fundamental agreement should not be limited to general declarations, but rather should point to specific rules including clarity of military budgets on the territories of other countries without their consent [as published], implementing all obligations concerning disarmament, arms control, and creation of confidence and security.

Third, provisions of Article 4 of the Washington Treaty should be widened in a way so as to make them read—among others—that consultations in the case of threats to territorial integrity, political independence or security, could also lead to defining joint measures aimed at reinstating and maintaining peace. The provision regarding consultations could be subject to a gradual

extension as cooperation with partners which are considered possible NATO members increases.

Fourth, possible bilateral agreements should allow for a diversification of the nature and scope of cooperation in accordance with the interests of both partners. The scope of cooperation should be dependent on the partners' observance of rules of behavior in military matters, and on the progress achieved in the area of developing democratic institutions.

Fifth, the offer of cooperation should be presented to all the partners on identical preconditions. However, a country's more speedy cooperation with NATO should not be impeded by the other countries.

Poland Will Not Be a Burden to NATO, But an Active Member

We are ready to join the nations which bear responsibility for defending and promoting the values which the alliance represents. We are also convinced that Poland is capable of bearing such responsibility.

That conviction of ours is based—among other things—on the fact that during the last four years we made enormous progress on the road toward democracy and stabilization. We are convinced of the stability of our democratic institutions. A peaceful change of government after the most recent parliamentary elections is proof of that.

It was stressed in a recent WALL STREET JOURNAL commentary: "All key figures of the political scene—from Lech Walesa to the former communists—approve of a joint list of written and unwritten fundamental principles of behavior in the case of victory or defeat." We are proud of our achievements in the area of reinstating human rights, including the rights of minorities.

We are confident about our economic potential and possibilities; we were successful in activating our own sources of growth, and especially private entrepreneurship. As a consequence of that, the growth of the domestic product exceeded 4 percent in 1993, and that is the best result in the region.

Aside from that, "Polish experience shows that stable economic growth is possible even during periods of parliamentary instability, as long as a truly a democratic and reliable Constitution is in force." (IHT, 13 December 1993)

Global security depends on stability and predictability with regard to what different countries will do. An increase in the number of countries adopting a democratic model for their development strengthens global security. The same applies to tolerance and to the willingness to seek a consensus, as well as a country's attachment to the principles of a free market. There is an agreement throughout Poland that the country's development should be based precisely on those principles and values. Polish people constitute a uniform society free of religious or ethnic tensions or divisions.

We are also—as I already mentioned—an "exporter of stabilization" in a region which still has quite a lot to do to achieve such stabilization.

Finally, Polish membership in NATO would constitute an example and an incentive for other countries of the region—including Russia—while at the same time confirming the proposition that the world of the wealthy and secure is not an exclusive club and that it is ready to accept new members in this way or another. As former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said: "The real tragedy would be having destroyed the concrete wall which used to divide Europe just to replace it with a 'security' wall separating countries from NATO." Such a wall would encourage seeking various "roundabout ways" and protectionist positions. The Visegrad Group, as well as other useful and promising regional arrangements, would simply evaporate.

I would also like to direct your attention to the fact (although it is perhaps a little out of vogue) that Poland has major land forces which are inferior in terms of size only when compared with the Armed Forces of Germany and France. True, the forces should be modernized and their important ingredients—such as the communications system—must be improved. But Poland—while being a country with a significant military tradition—is well aware that problems may be solved by various political means, and a strong and well-trained Army is one of them. We have demonstrated on quite a few occasions in the past that our partners can rely on our solidarity in defending freedom and democracy.

No Security System Will Be Permanent Without a Democratic and Strong Russia In other words, a strong and democratic Russia could be one of the most important guarantees of European peace and stabilization. So we should spare no effort to secure our willingness to see a democratic and strong Russia, the kind of country which would significantly contribute to a European security system.

We are intensely following the debate on the need for a strategic partnership between the United States and Russia. But efforts toward harmonizing the goals and means of the U.S. and Russian defense systems will fail to provide major benefits for the security of either country without the advance of large-scale assistance to Russia in rebuilding its economy and politics. An economic renewal in Russia is indispensable in helping prevent the spread of populism and attempts to reinstate some type of totalitarianism. A political renewal which would be geared toward developing democracy taking into account Russia's role in the world, could as well preoccupy the imagination of Russian people. Unless Russia becomes a democratic power with a market economy, no strategic partnership between it and the United States will be truly beneficial for world security.

One Must Follow Truman's Example

We encourage the United States—in accordance with the best tradition of its foreign policy—to lead the world in

providing assistance to Russia in building its democratic identity and a new kind of presence in the world. The United States should approach Russia in the same creative and comprehensive manner as President Harry Truman did in the past with regard to Germany and Japan. It was precisely that great vision and its implementation—and not nuclear power—that secured the survival of Western values and caused the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union.

We need a program currently which would contain:

—Recognition of Russia's current and future, political and economic significance. Russia should become a permanent member of the G-7. The European Union should establish a partnership relationship with Russia, which would allow for a free-trade treaty to be signed, and for gradual Russian involvement in the process of European integration;

—Economic assistance, both in the form of assisting Russia in stabilizing its economy, and in the form of securing easier access by Russia to Western markets. If Russia is to develop itself, it must have the possibility of competing in part of the world's markets;

—Assistance aimed at the revival and development of regional trade, including assistance in improving trade infrastructures and in creating institutions supporting regional trade. Good prospects for regional cooperation will counteract tendencies to rebuild the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union should not be recreated since that would weaken the Russian economy—Russia would then have to assist the lesser-developed republics at the expense of its own revival;

—Co-responsibility for peace in the region. Encouraging Russia to be the only guardian of peace on the territory of the former Soviet Union weakens the prospects for Russia's political and economic renewal. The few resources that the country has at its disposal would then be devoted to accomplishing the task, and not to economic development. It would also provide encouragement to think along imperial lines. General Odom is right when he says: "Preventing Russia from implementing its intentions to return to old, imperial methods in relation to the CIS and Eastern Europe, is an absolutely indispensable condition for Russia to continue its long and arduous journey toward liberalism in the dimension of their own country."

Allies old and new must reunite around a measure which would be very similar to the one which took place 45 years ago. I would like to cite Truman's words at this point: "To subordinate goals which are in essence of secondary importance to the more important need to develop a realistic and implementable policy which would secure first of all our survival, and secondly also—with the passage of time—the West's triumph." Poland is ready to join in such efforts.

Need for New Euro-Atlantic Treaty

There is a need for a democratic Russia to become party to a new Euro-Atlantic treaty which should contain the following principles:

—A widening of the area of stabilization being formed by NATO by including in the alliance those countries which in the past could not try to become members for reasons which were not up to them. These countries currently share values professed by the alliance, they constitute stabilization elements, and they also have the desire—and are capable—of effectively contributing to the accomplishment of NATO's goals;

—A new kind of relations between NATO and Russia which would cover issues of peace and security, and economic contacts which would be closer than up to now. These relations should lead to a strategic partnership with Russia, and to the country's integration into the world economic system.

Similar relations should be established with Ukraine, thus making it easier to accomplish its desire for security and prosperity.

We do not want to create new divisions in Europe. Rather, we want to overcome those divisions which are a consequence of the Cold War. Indeed, there is no room for new divisions on our continent. But at the same time we cannot agree to make old divisions permanent. We need a new kind of thinking on security and we need to look for new forms of cooperation which would suit the aspirations and needs of the individual countries, both big and small.

The contentions stated above define the Polish position on security. No significant political party or any major segment of society puts them into question. But this consensus will begin to disappear unless there is a message that the West also thinks along similar lines. We need such a message urgently. We need it in 1994, which is 50 years after we were all courageous and victorious allies in Normandy. We can be all those things again today.

Government Concordat With Vatican Debated

'Committee of Experts' Comments

LD2812214793 Warsaw PAP in English 2128 GMT 28 Dec 93

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 28—The concordat between Poland and the Vatican, signed by the Suchocka government in July 1993 but not yet ratified by the Polish Parliament, would if enacted be inconsistent with 16 existing Polish laws, a committee of experts has advised the new left-wing government.

According to a report carried on Warsaw's Radio "Zet" on Tuesday, the reports from the experts are to be

considered by the Polish Government. Minister Grzegorz Rydlewski, secretary of the Cabinet Socio-Economic Committee (KSPRM), later confirmed that the KSPRM had received five reports covering alleged legal discrepancies, but said that none of them represented the actual viewpoint of the government.

Rydlewski said that the government had requested expert opinion on the possible legal and constitutional consequences of the concordat, following discussions at the joint commission of the government and the Polish episcopate. The experts, including leading Polish jurists, have claimed that the concordat as it stands is in contradiction to several aspects of Polish law: Including the civil, family and guardians codes, the law on freedom of conscience and belief, and the law on church-state relations.

Rydlewski said that he feared the Suchocka government, in its work on the concordat, "had allowed itself too little time to decide on the consequences for Polish domestic law." He added that the present government had not yet considered the matter in any detail.

Also on Tuesday, Aleksander Kwasniewski, leader of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) parliamentary group, said that it was clear that legal discrepancies in the concordat between Poland and the Holy See must be clarified. "Since some of the wording is not clear (...) it is obvious to me that the minister of justice should draw the attention of the episcopate to the fact," Kwasniewski said.

Commenting on the suggestions that the concordat was at odds with Polish law in several areas, Kwasniewski noted that "Justice Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz is now doing what ought to have been done earlier, when the concordat had been at the stage of negotiation."

Justice Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, chair of the Cabinet Socio-Economic Committee, said that "in the formal-legal sphere," work on the concordat had been completed. The decision on sending it to the Sejm for ratification was a matter for the Council of Ministers (cabinet).

Deputy Prime Minister Aleksander Luczak said that the concordat ought to be ratified in the form signed by the previous government. However, he warned that "we must clarify what (the concordat) means (...), and to determine what changes will be needed for Polish legislation."

Poland's Roman Catholic episcopate stressed on Tuesday that the concordat was not an issue on which it was empowered to act. Deputy Secretary of the Polish Episcopate Bishop Alojzy Orszulik refused to confirm reports that the cabinet had forwarded one of the reports of experts for its consideration. He also insisted that the Polish episcopate is not a party to the treaty, which concerns the Republic of Poland and the Holy See.

He said that during meetings of the joint commission of the cabinet and the episcopate, there had been no talk of any stand on the matter. He said, however, he knew of some document which is in circulation at various offices and was drawn up by former director- general of the Office for Denominations Aleksander Merker, as an expert attached to the office one of the deputy prime ministers.

Official Seeks Amendments

LD2912145893 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0920 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Warsaw, 29 Dec—The Sejm should ratify the concordat but with amendments which would remove "serious legal shortcomings, which exist in this document at the moment," Aleksander Malachowski, the deputy Sejm Speaker, and the Union of Labor [UP] member, told Radio Zet today.

According to Malachowski, it was a bad thing that this document was signed during the "interregnum of the Parliament." And "it was done so quickly that coordination of the concordat's rules with other legal rules, especially applying to family, which now leads to fatal consequences" was not possible. He added that "the concordat which includes rules at variance with rules of the national law, is a bad concordat and as such should be subjected to some correction."

Malachowski stressed that it was not true that people who opposed the adoption of the concordat were against the normalization of state-church relations. The deputy Sejm speaker said that he had a grudge against Hanna Suchocka's government because "it failed to foresee that this might become the source of a conflict, or maybe they did foresee it."

"We cannot have a situation in which the existing laws are bent to suit political considerations, but this is what has happened," he said. Asked if the adoption of the concordat in such a shape by the previous government was a mistake, Malachowski replied that it was an "enormous" one and in consequence this would lead to yet another conflict.

Government Issues Statement

LD2912211393 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2000 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] In connection with mistaken information published by certain mass media, the Government Press Office declares that no expert opinion which has been offered on the matter of the legal consequences of the introduction of the regulations of the Concordat [with the Vatican] reflects the official stand of the government and has not been the subject of debate by the Socio-Political Committee of the Council of Ministers.

The Government Press Office, together with the Secretariat of the Polish Episcopate, declare that the church has not received any government document or expert opinion regarding the Concordat.

Bonds Sold Abroad To Help Finance Deficit

LD2912145193 Warsaw PAP in English 1425 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Warsaw, Dec 29—Privatization Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek told Polish radio "three" on Wednesday that the 1994 budget bill authorizes the finance minister to issue long-term bonds worth 45 trillion zlotys (ca 2 billion USd) to be distributed in Poland but "first of all" abroad in order to partially finance the budget deficit.

According to Kaczmarek, the document does not clearly say that the bonds are converted into foreign bond holders' ownership rights to shares in Polish enterprises.

Government, Miners Solidarity Sign Protocol

LD2912230093 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1830 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Relayed by Polonia TV network]

[Excerpts] Representatives of the government and of the miners' Solidarity have signed a protocol on the most important matters to be settled as far as the miners and the mining industry are concerned. Detailed negotiations will begin during the next two weeks.

[Correspondent Jan Szul] The miners are demanding a halt to the fall of real wages, amendments to the Labor Code, and an official definition of who is their employer. They also want social security for restructured mines. They demand that the matters which are the most important for their industry should be dealt with in a statutory manner. They consider social tracts to be ineffective.

[Karol Luzniak of the miners' Solidarity's hard coal section] Political statements flow from all sorts of people who are public people—that is, the prime minister, the president, ministers—and the implementation or the execution of these statements. [incomplete sentence as heard]

[Szul] The miners say that the laws on trade unions and on collective labor agreements are regularly not being observed in the enterprises.

[Krzysztof Milek of miners Solidarity's mining and power section] We are also demanding one other thing: That it should be clearly and specifically said that in the case of those enterprises in which the State Treasury holds at least 51 percent of the value of the enterprise those enterprises are considered to be state enterprises, and in that case we are sure that there either will be a law on trade unions or there will not.

[Szul] The trade unionists are also complaining that they do not have access to financial information regarding their enterprises, even though they are a party to the negotiations with the government and the employers. [passage omitted]

All these problems have been presented to the representatives of the Ministries of Finance, Industry, Ownership Transformation, Health, Labor, and the Central Planning Office. Negotiations should begin within the next two weeks. [passage omitted]

During today's talks the government openly admitted that state interventionism in the mining industry will have to continue. There is no doubt that the mines which are not efficient or those whose seams are almost exhausted, will be closed down. In the remainder work efficiency must be increased.

Striking Miners Insist on 'Concrete' Proposals

LD3012120693 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1100 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Relayed by TV Polonia network]

[Text] Talks between government representatives and the representatives of the striking miners from the Boguszow barite mine and its branch in Stanislawow are to begin at the Ministry of Industry and Trade in Warsaw at 1500 hours.

The striking miners are demanding welfare protection from the government and a clear policy on the future of the colliery, which is threatened with closure. The miners claim that if the government does not put forward concrete resolutions they will wall themselves in with air bricks in the drivage in which they are striking.

Sixty-three miners have been protesting in the Walbrzych colliery and its branch in Stanislawow since Christmas Eve. The government believes that the resolution of the colliery's problems depends on the miners' return to work. The strikers are supported by Marian Krzaklewski, Solidarity chairman, who paid a visit to the colliery yesterday.

Further Reaction to Comments by Zhirinovskiy

Senators Condemn Statements

AU2912125493 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1206 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/12/1993—Wednesday, 29 December the Romanian Senate united in condemning the statements made in Sofia by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, who said the Romanian people originates in Italian Gypsies and that Romania was an artificial state formed of territories seized from Russia, Bulgaria and Hungary.

"The difference between Zhirinovskiy's party and a lunatic asylum is that the latter has a normal leadership," said Ioan Aurel Stoica, leader of the Democratic Party (National Salvation Front) [PD(FSN)] group. Zhirinovskiy's statements vex the dignity of the Romanian people, he said, and requested the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue at once a decent protest and convey it the same day to the Russian ultra-nationalist party leader.

"Out of his mind" was the diagnosis pronounced by the Greater Romania Party (PRM) President Corneliu Vadim Tudor against Zhirinovskiy. The PRM leader said his party was simply aghast at such allegations.

Civic Alliance Party (PAC) Senator Emil Tocaci warned that the claims made by Zhirinovskiy were not just the outburst of a mentally insane person as long as he reaped such success in the latest elections in Russia: "He no longer speaks for himself," he said and added that Zhirinovskiy's ideas were old bolshevik theories resumed.

Senator Florin Radulescu Botica, of the ruling Social Democracy Party of Romania (PDSR), termed Zhirinovskiy's declarations as a "deeply anti-Romanian act," and their author as "a political character born of the nightmares of history." Other speakers came to the rostrum to voice similar protests.

Russian Envoy 'Dissociates Himself'

AU2912160893 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Yevgeniy Ostrovenko, ambassador of the Russian Federation to Bucharest, was summoned at noon today at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connection with Zhirinovskiy's insulting remarks about Romania and the Romanian people. The Russian ambassador to Bucharest said that, in his capacity as representative of the president and Government of the Russian Federation, he fully dissociates himself from Zhirinovskiy's statements, which do not and cannot possibly represent his country's position vis-a-vis Romania—so reports our correspondent at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Doina Saiciuc.

Visa Refusal Considered

AU2912181093 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1713 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/12/1993—The head of the Romanian diplomacy [Foreign Affairs Minister Teodor Melescanu] said at a press conference on Wednesday 29 December that the recent statements made by the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, were "the most insulting ones addressed to the Romanian people." The Romanian Government too released on Wednesday a statement referring to the same issue. The Russian ambassador in Bucharest was invited for discussions at the Romanian Foreign Ministry. Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu said that a dissociation would be desirable on the part of the authorities in Moscow and added that it was possible that "the author of those statements be refused permission to enter Romanian territory." Insisting on the Romanian-Russian relations, Minister Melescanu said they were affected by the Ilascu case in the first place and by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's statement in the second place. "In spite of all these, our principle remains that of promoting friendly relations with the Russian Federation," Minister Melescanu said.

The Romanian foreign minister said also that efforts must be made to improve the Romanian-Russian relations which should be "supported through encouraging messages from the Russian Federation."

PDSR 'Firmly Condemns' Comments

AU3012125193 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] The Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] firmly condemns the irresponsible statement addressed to Romania and the Romanian nation by the leader of the Democratic Liberal Party of Russia, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy.

In the declaration issued today and faxed to us as well, the PDSR assesses that the aforementioned statement does not merely prove that its author inadmissibly ignores fundamental historic events, but also that he totally lacks respect for elementary norms of international right and politeness, which is a typical trait of imperialist totalitarianism.

The PDSR expresses its belief that the democratic forces of Russia will contain the extremist-nationalist circles in that country and thus ensure the success of the economic reforms promoted by President Boris Yeltsin, the establishment of the law-governed state, and the promotion of a peaceful cooperation policy in Europe and in the whole world.

The PDSR, in its capacity as the ruling party, wishes to reassert once more that Romania is interested in furthering mutually advantageous cooperation relations with the Russian Federation, on the basis of observing each other's independence, national sovereignty, and the

right of each people to strive for its national aspirations and the security of its own country.

The declaration also addresses an appeal to Romania's political and social forces and to democratic parties throughout the world to raise their voices against the perilous statements made by a person who [words indistinct] of obscure circles, is menacing with war and the phantom of barbarian invasions. The declaration is signed by PDSR Chairman Oliviu Gherman.

Defense Ministry Ready To Join NATO

AU2912165793 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] The following press communique was distributed to correspondents at a news conference held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

On the eve of the summit meeting of the NATO states on 10 January 1994, Romanian President Ion Iliescu sent a letter on 24 December to the heads of states and governments of the NATO member countries.

The letter by Romania's president reconfirms our country's constant interest in becoming a member with full rights of that organization—the only one able to guarantee stability on the European continent and Romania's vital interests in security.

Romania has demonstrated its interest and reiterates its readiness to participate in the new form of cooperation represented by the Partnership for Peace as an important preliminary stage in the process of its full integration in NATO.

According to the opinion of the Romanian president, NATO membership represents an essential part of the global process of Romania's integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures, which is the essential goal of Romania's foreign policy that is being supported by all the political parties represented in Romania's Parliament and by the entire Romanian people, the press communique of the Ministry of National Defense emphasizes in conclusion.

Melescanu on NATO Integration

AU2912182593 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1638 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/12/1993—Romanian chief diplomat [Foreign Affairs Minister] Teodor Melescanu assessed at the news conference of December 29 that the coming year would be "less spectacular, but difficult." In that respect, the foreign minister said that 1994 would be the year of completion of the process of Romania's integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures, but also of the country's more active involvement in the building of security in the area and the relaunching of the bilateral relations with its neighbors. The foreign minister sees the future year as "crucial," because Romania will have to prove its commitments to the international institutions.

Teodor Melescanu assessed hat the forthcoming meeting of the heads of states and governments of the North-Atlantic alliance was for the Romanian diplomacy "only the framework for the conclusion of an agreement on Partnership for Peace." In other words, this meeting will put in place "the requisites" for the integration of all countries of East Europe within NATO. About the possibility of Romania's becoming a NATO member, Teodor Melescanu said it depended on the expression of the Romanian state's political will, a step which the authorities in Bucharest have already taken, but also on a long financial and military preparation. "I believe that the only approach to the issue is a period of transition that should allow for the enlargement of the NATO structures all at once, or else unbearable tensions might appear," the Romanian foreign minister added.

Of the tour by U.S. President Bill Clinton of some East European countries, members of the "Visegrad Group," [Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary] Melescanu said that "the role and prospects of this system of consultations must not be overrated."

In concluding the news conference, Teodor Melescanu termed the relations with the Romanian diaspora abroad as "extremely important, but still very far from what we wish," because of "the handicap of a 50-year long period of break in these relations and the current austerity budget."

Officials Explains Privatization Slowdown

AU2812202293 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1547 GMT 28 Dec 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 28/12/1993—As many as 253 commercial companies with a total nominal capital of over 60 billion lei went private since the setting up of the State Property Fund [FPS] on 21 October 1992. The FPS's share in that capital is over 41 billion lei, reads the release presented at the news conference of FPS, on 28 December.

The pace of privatization has been speeded up in December, considering that 156 commercial companies were privatized by 25 November 1993, while merely over the past 30 days almost 100 more went private. Considering these figures, the FPS board thinks that the year 1994 will be a year of privatization and 2,000 companies might go private next year.

Asked whether there was a "politization of FPS," Emil Dima, chairman of the FPS board, answered that of the 17 members of the board of administration only two were members of the ruling party [Social Democracy Party of Romania—PDSR] and the appointment of the FPS representatives at county level was made after consultations with the members of the board of administration.

"FPS is responsible only to parliament," Gheorghe Zaman, member of the FPS board, said. He assessed that objective conditions like inflation, shortage of domestic and foreign capital, and the lack of experience were to be blamed, rather than FPS, for the slow-down in privatization. The speaker said privatization had to be done, but "not through a shock therapy, not in a forceful way, as cooperativization was made."

Gheorghe Cojocaru, a member of the FPS board of administration, said that privatization "does not progress more slowly" than in other countries. He sustained his statement with data from the report of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] regarding the stage of privatization in 30 countries, drawn up last October. The EBRD report shows that the percentage of privatized companies is far bigger in Romania than in Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary.

Roman Outlines National Pact Goals

AU2912153393 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] At a news conference held by the Democratic Party (National Salvation Front) [PD-FSN] today, a communique of the Social-Democratic Alliance was presented, which had been prepared by the Coordination Council following a meeting last night.

The communique expresses the opinion that the discussions held at Cotroceni Palace [presidency] between Romania's president, Mr. Ion Iliescu, and parliamentary party leaders have not generated hope, either through the subject or the way in which they were arranged.

As far as the political pact is concerned, the Social-Democratic Alliance communique considers it outdated. It considers the social pact proposed by the big trade union organizations much more up to date and the only one able to ensure social peace and quiet, provided a coalition government is established on the basis of a different parliamentary majority, our reporter Elena Perdichi informed us.

At the same news conference, the PD(FSN) president, Mr. Petre Roman, presented the main elements of the national pact proposed by the political formation he leads. Saying that it should not be confused with a government program, Mr. Roman emphasized that the elements of this national pact are structured according to three areas—political, social, and economic.

In the political area, these elements are, among other things, the elimination of verbal violence from politics, the independence of the judiciary and the professional and nonpolitical nature of the institutions of state security and public order, and support for the policy of Romania's integration in Euro-Atlantic structures.

In the social area, the national pact proposed by the PD(FSN) incorporates the identification of the minimum net wage in order to establish the poverty threshold that should not be exceeded, and turning the unemployment and pension funds into investment institutions.

As far as the economic area is concerned, the promotion of popular capitalism that will encourage small- and medium-size ownership, as well as the stabilization of farming are, in Mr. Roman's opinion, the main elements on which the political forces, trade unions, and the civilian society should reach consensus.

Answering journalists' questions, Mr. Eugen Dijmarescu, said that to empower the government to issue ordinances is at variance with public interest, and the proposal to convene an extraordinary parliament session was assessed as realistic and correct.

Within the same context, Mr. Roman warned that to circumvent Parliament when adopting important decisions for the country raises the potential danger of sliding toward totalitarianism.

Foreign Debt Exceeds $3 Billion

AU2912142693 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1025 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/12/1993—Romania's foreign debt as at 30 September 1993, accumulated from medium and long-term credits guaranteed by the Romanian state, stood at $3,023.1 million, up from the $2.354 billion debt at the end of 1992. The overall 1993 public foreign debt of Romania is estimated by the national prognosis committee at $3.4 billion and for 1994 at $4.9 billion.

Serbs Fire on NATO Planes Over Teocak

AU2912191893 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] The convoy of UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Forces] vehicles moving along the (Cavna)-Teocak road was targeted by chetnik missiles. Hajrudin Sermic reports:

[Begin Sermic recording] UNPROFOR members returned fire, so a real clash broke out and went on for some 15 minutes. After about half an hour, the NATO planes appeared and swooped over [words indistinct]. The chetniks did not seem to like that, so they opened fire with antiaircraft guns at the planes, after which they were forced to flee the area, confident that the top bodies of the United Nations would discuss this act. [end recording]

Serbs, UNPROFOR Convoy Exchange Fire

AU3012144593 Paris AFP in English 1331 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] Sarajevo, Dec 30 (AFP)—A convoy from the United Nations Protection Force [UNPROFOR] delivering special New Year aid came under fire twice from Bosnian Serb forces in north-east Bosnia-Herzegovina and returned fire, an UNPROFOR spokesman said here Thursday. No one from the convoy was hurt and it was not known if there were any victims from the return fire.

The convoy, from the Second Nordic Battalion (Nordbat 2), was carrying out a request from the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to supply the New Year's aid to Sapna near the border with Serbia. On Tuesday it was targeted by heavy snipers and light arms coming from Bosnian Serb positions, spokesman Idesbald van Biesebroeck said. The convoy shot back with 84-millimetre shells and continued on its way.

On Wednesday morning, while distribution of aid was in progress, Bosnian Serbs shot again at the convoy which again fired back, he said. The distribution then continued normally.

NATO aircraft flew over the zone at the time of the incident during a routine mission, but their intervention had not been requested by the convoy, Van Biesebroeck declared. He would not confirm or deny radio reports from Sarajevo that Serb forces had opened fire on the planes as they flew at low altitude. "We have no evidence (of this)," he said.

Krajisnik Foresees 1994 Union With Bosnian Serbs

LD3012103693 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0932 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] Jagodina, 30 December (TANJUG)—President of the assembly of the republic of Srpska Momcilo Krajisnik stated this morning that settlement between the three national communities in former Bosnia-Herzegovina would be achieved soon and that the republic of Srpska and the republic of Serb Krajina would merge into a single state in the second half of 1994 at the latest.

This is the desire of the state and political leadership of the republic of Srpska, which I am convinced is shared by the republic of Serb Krajina, Krajisnik said in a statement for Jagodina Radio. He stressed that this would be a single state with a single parliament and one government, just as the Serbs share one religion and one alphabet. The international public and all the sides in former Bosnia-Herzegovina are aware of it, since union as an interim solution has become outdated, which is also the opinion of the international community, Krajisnik said.

Krajisnik Discusses Maps, Territory Issues

AU2912141093 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 26 Dec 93

[Article by Ilija Zurovac: "Troubles With Maps"]

[Text] The sacrifices that the Serbian side was prepared to make at the Geneva and Brussels negotiations to fulfill the European Union's requests regarding territorial concessions to the Muslims were not small. However, this was not regarded as progress by the militant leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They simply do not wish to end the war.

This is how Momcilo Krajisnik, chairman of the republic of Srpska assembly and member of the Serb delegation at the "Bosnian negotiations," assesses the reasons for the failure of the recently ended summit. Krajisnik claims that the Serb delegation was optimistic when it traveled to Geneva. We had prepared a proposal with certain territorial concessions, believing that this would form a solid basis for signing the peace agreement. However, the Muslims once again ignored Serb concessions.

"That was their cardinal mistake," says Krajisnik. "They have made a move to their disadvantage, a move that will lead the Bosnian people into a hopeless situation. If the Muslims want to do something good for themselves, they should primarily distance themselves from their militant leadership. Europe already understands that it has to change its attitude toward the Muslims, and that all three sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina have to be treated equally.

Large Appetites

According to Krajisnik, the talks on the demarcation and the work on the maps were the toughest and hardest part of the negotiations. The talks took place in a very disagreeable atmosphere. After considerable effort on the part of the cochairmen and the other participants in the talks, it was Slobodan Milosevic's great role that was crucial for defining the initial platform.

We began with the Muslims' request for access to the Sava River at Brcko. At first we agreed that the so-called corridor toward the republic of Serbian Krajina should not be narrowed, which was present in the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, and then we agreed that the Muslims could have access to a part of this town. However, not via the railroad—which used to be the case and which used to be the border—but via the Brka River. In this way, the Muslims would get the western part of the town, and the Serbs would get the eastern part, explains Krajisnik.

The demarcation on the ground—and this will apply to other cases too—will be carried out by a mixed Muslim-Serbian committee, in which premier Vladimir Lukic, and ministers Aleksa Buha and Radosav Brdjanin will represent the Serb side. One of the first tasks will be the demarcation around Doboj.

Here we need to solve the issue of the railroad line, which makes a turn toward Tuzla just before Doboj, and continues through Serb territory from Doboj to Trebava. This concession would secure the Muslims' railroad communications on the Zenica-Tuzla route. The Muslim side accepted this proposal, says Krajisnik.

The Serbs rejected the proposal to give the Muslims a corridor from Srebrenica and Gorazde toward Tuzla. Krajisnik says that they were offered a somewhat more functional corridor from Zepa toward Gorazde, provided that the Serbs could have the right of the so- called "T-passage"—a crossing of lines with the Muslims—applicable to the long distance power lines, railroad, and road. [sentence as published] This proposal was rejected by the Muslims because they wish to extend their enclave to include some parts of Bratunac and Zvornik and they also want Ustipraca. Moreover, they continue to insist on access to the Drina River, which, according to Krajisnik, is unacceptable.

Who is Going to the Sea?

Krajisnik stressed that the Muslims had also rejected the Serbian territorial concessions in western Bosnia, along the Una River, and asked for a wider belt of territory. They are demanding the Sana River and Prijedor. They stated that the main reason for the rejection was a corresponding extension of territory in eastern Bosnia, along the Drina River. Krajisnik reiterates that the plan regarding demarcation along the Una River had been drawn up earlier by a mixed Serb-Muslim committee, and was also accepted by Fikret Abdic, who has the greatest interests there.

As far as demarcation in Herzegovina is concerned, Momcilo Krajisnik says that the Serb side has demanded access to the Neretva River, similar to the Muslim one in Brcko. Concretely, the Serbs are demanding a belt of territory from Ortijes (in the vicinity of the airport, south of Mostar, on the right bank of the Neretva River) to Zitomislic, some 10 km long.

As far as Mostar is concerned, the Croats have agreed that his town should be under a EU protectorate, provided that in the meantime it is established what is included in the "Mostar region." Chances for the Serbs to participate in the partition of Mostar are minimal. Krajisnik says that the Serbs will insist on the Bjelusina commune on the left bank of the Neretva River. This is the part of Mostar better know as Brakopac or Santic's Mostar.

Judging by everything, Serbian access to the sea has been agreed upon. The chairman of the Serbian republic assembly claims that the Croats have agreed to concede a part of the Dubrovnik hinterland in the Trebinje commune. In that case, the Serbian sea would stretch from Ostri Rt [Cape Ostri] to Molunat, all together some 18 km.

However, the situation regarding the Muslim access to the sea still has not been clarified. The Croats will not agree to give them access at Neum. Instead of this, they were offered a different solution—a band of territory some 8 km long, from Molunat towards Slano. The Muslims would have access to there via a corridor running along the left border of Popovo Polje, currently uninhabited. In this way they would in practice be a kind of buffer zone between the Serbs and the Croats. The Muslim side has not commented on this proposal, but Krajisnik believes that they do not have much choice.

The situation with Sarajevo remains the same—neither side is willing to give up its demands. The Muslims are calling for a UN protectorate, and the Serbs want a partition into two cities.

Krajisnik hopes that by the time the new summit takes place in Geneva on 15 January, the republic of Srpska assembly will have disclosed its position on everything. He also hopes that the Muslims will give positive answers to Serb proposals.

[Box 1., p 7]

The Croats

Territorial demarcation between the Serbs and the Croats will be solved politically over a longer period of time, says Krajisnik. The demarcation with the Croats is different. They are investing maximal efforts into creating their own state, globally speaking. However, solutions for the republic of Serbian Krajina or the republic of Srpska cannot be excluded from this. I can say that there are still a lot of unsolved issues. However, we hope that political agreements will yield satisfactory results.

Herceg-Bosna Assembly Briefed on Negotiations

LD2912170593 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Report from Mostar by correspondent Zdenko Vranjes]

[Text] In Mostar today the chamber of deputies of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna reviewed the course of

the political negotiations on the future setup of Bosnia-Herzegovina and, more precisely, various proposals of territorial division presented at the negotiations.

Mile Akmadzic, member of the Croat negotiating team, informed the deputies about the course of negotiations. The EU ministerial council accepted the stand on which the Croats insisted that the territory of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna should not be smaller than 17.5 percent of the total area of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The military factor is increasingly important at the negotiations, that is, the fact of who is in military control of which area.

The Serb side proposed that Jajce and Donji Vakuf should be allocated to the Muslims, rather than the Croats. The Croats would agree to that, if in return they obtained Kresevo and Kiseljak, as well as Gornji Vakuf and Bugojno, as parts of Herceg-Bosna. The Croat side does not approve of access to the sea for the Muslims in Neum. The areas of Novi Travnik, Vitez, and Busovaca are unquestionably parts of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna. According to the latest proposals, the Croat area of Bosnian Posavina should be considerably larger and wider. This is only part of everything that Mile Akmadzic explained in detail while speaking about the negotiations.

During a rather heated debate, some deputies objected to the Croat negotiators as being too lenient, while most people who took part in the debate spoke in very positive terms about the Croat stands at the negotiations, saying that they are conducting the negotiations with full respect for Croat interests and the state of affairs.

It was repeated several times that the position of the Croat side can only be improved by a better military organization and the effectiveness of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] units in defense of Croat areas, and that the Croat side can lose nothing by negotiating, but everything should be done so it does not lose on the battlefields.

We should reinforce the borders of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, and at the negotiations we will not accept anything that is not in the interest of the whole of the Croat nation, Mate Boban, president of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, said during the debate.

At the end of the discussion, Akmadzic's report was approved with two abstentions, and the Croat negotiators were given full support.

Deputies from central Bosnia did not manage to attend the session, but they sent a letter saying that at the most difficult moments the Croats in the Lasva Valley expect that something will be done to break the blockade of central Bosnia and link it with the other areas of Herceg-Bosna. The session continues with several draft laws on the agenda.

Mostar is quiet again. Sporadic strong explosions could be heard in the city center this afternoon.

Krajisnik Comments on Fighting

LD3012122293 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1116 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] Sarajevo, 30 Dec (TANJUG)—Deputies to the people's assembly of the republic of Srpska today decided that a report and discussion on peace negotiations in Geneva and Brussels should be the last item on the 60-point agenda.

The assembly then continued its session by examining a report on the work of the people's assembly of the republic of Srpska over the past two years. In his introductory report, Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the republic of Srpska assembly, emphasized the time and circumstances which incited the Serbian people in former Bosnia-Herzegovina to organize the defense of their centuries-old homes and existence, after the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina seceded.

"The results of our fighting are evident in the resolve of our people to oppose violence, survive as a master in his own home, and organize its own country as a guarantee of its existence," Krajisnik stressed.

"In this war period we have held 21 parliamentary sessions, which is a confirmation of our statehood and our people's orientation to democracy," Krajisnik added.

Army Chief Accuses Serbia of Sending Troops

AU3012094693 Paris AFP in English 0031 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] Sarajevo, Dec 30 (AFP)—Serbian troops sent by Belgrade have been fighting alongside Bosnian Serb forces in clashes with the majority-Moslem Bosnian Army, a Bosnian Army commander charged Wednesday [29 December]. Major Ismet Dahic said two units from Belgrade had been detected by the Bosnian Army in a build-up of tanks and troops in Semizovac about 10 kilometres (six miles) northwest of Sarajevo. He said in an interview with Bosnian television that one of them was a "unit of special forces."

Dahic, second in command of the 1st Bosnian Army Corps, said he feared a further offensive on Sarajevo, following a Serb attack on Olovo about 40 kilometres (24 miles) from Sarajevo. He said the Serbs wanted to cut the north of the Bosnian capital in two in order to link up with Rajlovac, held by the Serbs in the northwest of Sarajevo.

Bosnian Army officials have accused Serbia in the past of sending troops to aid the Bosnian Serbs, and alleged that Croatia has also sent forces to fight with the Bosnian Croats. The UN Protection Force has never confirmed the allegations, and late Wednesday no one from the UNPROFOR was available to comment on Dahic's remarks.

Fighting between Bosnian Serb forces and the Moslem-dominated Bosnian army has left the number of dead "in the hundreds, notably on the Serb side" in the central Bosnian towns of Olovo and Teocak in recent weeks, western military sources told AFP earlier Wednesday.

Interior Minister Interviewed on Foreign Tour

LD2912225093 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Studio interview with Bakir Alispahic, minister of internal affairs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by program announcer—live]

[Text] [Announcer] Bakir Alispahic, minister of internal affairs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has returned to Sarajevo from his tour of the United States, Turkey, and some other European states. He is our guest this evening. Minister, welcome and good evening.

[Alispahic] Good evening.

[Announcer] I am sure that our listeners and viewers will want to know the object of your visit to the United States. To begin with, what can you tell the public?

[Alispahic] My visit to the United States and other countries was organized at the invitation of the countries which I visited, that is, it was an official visit. It seems that the visit was very well planned by those countries, and it was very informative. As the head of the delegation—I was accompanied by my colleagues from the ministry—I am very satisfied with the visit.

In the United States we had a series of meetings with top officials from the State Department, people from the Congress, and certain diplomats in UN headquarters. We had talks with the ambassadors of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malaysia, and the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.

The visit to the security services was particularly important and interesting. It seems to me that as a security service we benefited most from that visit. I would like to stress that the visit—about which I would prefer not to give details, except to say that it was very useful, primarily for the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina—was also very important politically at this moment.

As I have said, we had a series of meetings with politicians. During those meetings I realized that a certain number of officials, who could in a certain way help Bosnia-Herzegovina, are not familiar with the true state of affairs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I believe that our reports, our additional information, which they really found very interesting, have left a clear picture about Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think that at the end we reached agreement on many issues, and I believe that in the future—of course, not solely as a consequence of our visit—the United States will take a more active part in (?resolving political and economic issues) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Announcer] Before I ask you about your visit to Turkey, could you please tell us about the contacts with those services, that is, with your opposite numbers in the United States?

[Alispahic] In the United States we planned to and we spent most time in the security service, naturally, and I think that was most useful. We obtained a lot of useful information, we exchanged a lot of information from the point of view of our services, that is, security reports, reports on security officers, and information which will certainly have a great impact on conducting policy; it will surely be useful to U.S. policy.

[Announcer] Obviously, Turkey is a friendly country. How was your visit to Turkey, and are there any practical results [words indistinct]?

[Alispahic] From the whole trip, the visits to all countries, my most pleasant impressions are from Turkey. That is, Turkey is the country which sees the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the best and deepest way. It seems to me that Turkey is the keenest to help. Turkey is a very open country, and, as I said, it has understood the problems facing Bosnia-Herzegovina. I believe that with its foreign policy, and in other ways, Turkey is trying to (?urge) other countries to solve the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina as soon as possible.

In connection with the visit to Turkey, our visit to the Ministry of Internal Affairs was particularly interesting. We found a great understanding, doors wide open to cooperation and an understanding of that service—the service of the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs. I think that we resolved issues of mutual interest, exclusively at the level of our services' cooperation, and decided on the further development of our activities and future contacts.

I think that very soon we will be in position to carry out contacts and exchange reports with that country. I sincerely hope and expect to see assistance from that country as soon as possible—all types of assistance—financial assistance, equipment, and uniforms. We agreed on this with Turkey and some other countries.

Now it is up to the United Nations and other factors which can exert influence for what is regarded as normal—namely, that the police force of a country has uniforms and other equipment—to help us import these things in a legal way, so that our policemen, the policemen of Bosnia-Herzegovina have uniforms with official insignia that differ from those of members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

I believe that we initiated possibilities for receiving assistance from those countries, especially Turkey, and I am an optimist in believing that soon after the New Year

[words indistinct] find understanding with decision-making factors on those issues.

[Announcer] How about Austria and Slovenia, have you had any interesting contacts with their services?

[Alispahic] As far as Austria and Slovenia are concerned, contacts with those countries and their services already exist. The contacts between our security service and the security services of those countries are especially interesting. That is, we have developed quite a degree of cooperation with those countries, in the sense of exchanging security information and data with Austria and Slovenia.

Let me recall that many of our people are currently residing abroad and that some of them are known for their deviant behavior. We have made information about such people available to the services of those countries. Quite a number of these people live in Austria and Slovenia. Apart from contacts with those services and the information we provide, those services are certainly interested in this because they are able to monitor the criminal activities of those individuals on the basis of the information they receive from us - we had good reason to meet with these officials from the standpoint of our involvement with Interpol. It is well known that Bosnia-Herzegovina has been cooperating with Interpol for over a year now, that this cooperation had until recently been confined to the exchange of letters but that this was the first time personal contact was established between the head of our Interpol branch and the heads of the Austrian and Slovene branches.

Top-level contacts were made with these countries, at ministerial level. Both these countries expressed interest in helping Bosnia-Herzegovina and its Interior Ministry in every way, even extending a certain form of aid. This aid has really been agreed. I believe that this is a concrete agreement, it is being implemented right now, we have established direct contact. We have opened the door of cooperation with those countries.

Commentary on Croat Reaction to Muslim Actions

LD2812195493 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 28 Dec 93

[Text] Muslim forces violated the Christmas cease-fire agreed at the Brussels peace talks, as they had done on all previous occasions. Moreover, the Muslims staged their offensive on Christmas itself so as to catch the Croat defenders off guard.

The latest developments on the fronts vividly attest to the fact that the Muslims are unreliable partners who disregard agreements and cannot be trusted. An important question imposes itself—when will the leadership of the Croat people of Herceg-Bosna and the people themselves realize just how dangerous their opponent is and start acting accordingly? A commentary by Ivan Kristic.

[Kristic] The light at the end of the Bosnian war tunnel is still out of sight. The latest talks in Geneva and Brussels on the Franco-German peace proposal, backed by the European Union, were just one stage in the arduous quest for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a land enveloped in the thick, opaque mist of war.

The conduct of the Muslim leadership at the talks and after them only goes to show that it has unequivocally opted for war. Namely, the Muslim political leadership believes that time is on its side. They wish to capitalize on their numerical superiority to equip their increasingly well-armed army. Some of the arms are manufactured in factories captured by the Muslims, some of them are bought for petrodollars received as aid from Islamic countries, and there are indications to support claims that some of the arms are concealed in airdrop relief packages while some are smuggled by bribed UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] units.

Since the Muslim leadership's main strategic objective is the creation of an Islamic state—regardless of its size—it is ready to pay the highest possible price to attain this objective. Statements made by [Muslim presidency member] Ejup Ganic and the rest of Izetbegovic's foot-soldiers on how they are ready to sacrifice another 200,000 Muslim youths to realize their plans should not be interpreted as inane blabber—despite the bravado—but as fanaticism deeply rooted in fundamentalism.

The creators of [Bosnian] Muslim political philosophy are aware that they will have a rough time regaining the territories in eastern Bosnia and Bosnian Krajina occupied by the Serbs in the initial stages of their aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina. They believe compensation for this can be found in snatching away traditionally Croat-populated areas. This is the driving force behind the Muslim aggression against the Croats, the guiding light for all their offensives, including the latest one.

The desperate persistence with which the Muslims are trying to overrun Croat territories in central Bosnia—and turn them into Croat-free regions—convincingly corroborates their orientation.

As the ability to foresee certain events is a virtue in politics, it is not quite clear why it took the political leadership of the Croat people in Herceg-Bosna so long to realize in which direction the winds of war were blowing. The logical sequel was the absence of a precisely outlined political platform for reaching a nationwide consensus and for achieving coordinated action with an emphasis on defense.

Wartime is not exactly the time for laissez faire tactics and attitudes. Our benevolence was interpreted as cooperativeness so we ended up viewed as the softest party, the side in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict most vulner

able to pressure. Therefore, it is high time to analyze the situation with utmost seriousness, remove shortcomings, define strategic objectives and inform the people about all this so all forces could rally at the defense line of the Croat people's right to be masters on their own turf. This cannot be accomplished by hollow rhetoric but by a fierce struggle in this defensive war whose burden should be evenly distributed. These matters should be addressed with utmost urgency. If this is not done—it might just be too late.

Sarajevo Evacuation Convoy Reaches Croatia

AU3012133193 Paris AFP in English 1247 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] Zagreb, Dec 30 (AFP)—A convoy of buses ferrying 800 Moslem Slavs and Bosnian Croats from Sarajevo reached the Croatian border near Metkovic on Thursday [30 December], UN High Commissioner for Refugees spokeswoman Alemka Lisinski said here. Once customs formalities were completed, the 16 buses would head for Split on the Adriatic coast 120 kilometres (70 miles) to the north, a trip lasting several hours, she said.

The convoy, including many children and elderly people, left the Bosnian capital on Tuesday. Bad roads and a spate of technical hitches delayed its progress. In Sarajevo, UNHCR spokesman Ray Wilkinson said the buses had spent the night near Stolac in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina because they had arrived too late to cross the front line between positions held by Bosnian Serbs and Croatian-controlled territory.

He said the UNHCR was going to feed the evacuees before the journey to Split began. "These people are probably quite hungry, since they had only a few food supplies with them when they left Sarajevo on Tuesday," Wilkinson remarked. "It was not anticipated that it would take so long."

A group of 150 Bosnian Serbs evacuated the same day, heading for Belgrade, arrived in Serbia on Wednesday.

TANJUG Reports Fighting on Various Fronts

LD2912151093 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1425 GMT 29 Dec 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Dec 29 (TANJUG)—Fighting between the Bosnian Croat HVO [Croatian Defense Council] militia and forces loyal to Moslem fundamentalist leader Alija Izetbegovic escalated in the Neretva River Valley on Wednesday, Serb military sources said. The clashes were reported also by the Croat and Moslem radios.

Fierce infantry battles with artillery support, especially on the part of Croat forces, took place in the Malo Polje area, some ten kilometers south of Mostar, and in Bijelo Polje to the north. Fighting was especially heavy around Jablanica and Konjic.

Intra-Moslem battles continued in the autonomous province of western Bosnia, the sources said.

Moslem radio said HVO forces started shelling Moslem-controlled parts of Mostar on Wednesday morning from heights just outside the city. It reported one dead and nine seriously and slightly wounded Moslem troops, and said Moslems soldiers taken prisoner were being forced to dig trenches for the HVO.

The Defense Ministry of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna said Moslem forces unleashed fierce attacks in the Zepca area in central Bosnia. It added that Moslem saboteurs and terrorists were also operating in the area. Croatian radio reported that Moslem forces were assaulting HVO positions in the Kiseljak area near Sarajevo.

The strongest Moslem attacks on Serb positions in the last 24 hours were in the Doboj region in northern and in central Bosnia, Serb military sources said. The Bosnian Serb forces prevented an attempt by a Moslem terrorist group to infiltrate the territory of the republic of Srpska in the Doboj area.

Serb positions along the Olovo-Kladanj route also came under Moslem artillery fire and infantry attack. Moslem units in the area continued regrouping and bringing in heavy weaponry from Tuzla.

General Bobetko Interviewed on Krajina, Bosnia

LD3012111093 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2155 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Studio interview with Corps General Janko Bobetko, chief of general staff of the Croatian Army, by unidentified announcer—live]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] General Bobetko, good evening and welcome. [passage omitted] Can you comment on Yugoslav Army General Perisic's contention that the Croatian Army lacks the strength for a full-scale assault on the republic of Serb Krajina?

[Bobetko] You see, it is the same thing again. On the one hand, the underestimation that Croatia does not have the military might and that it is biologically and otherwise exhausted, and on the other hand, that most of its forces are in Bosnia, which means that it is interfering, and hampering a solution which the Serb Krajina as a state is for them, of course, a fait accompli. And third, he [Perisic] warns the world that this situation should be accepted.

However, they forget one thing. An eminent diplomat recently asked me whether the same mood prevailed in Croatia now as in 1990 and 1991, whether the national impetus, which puts the entire nation on the move, is still very strong? I told him: You know, Mister, I do not want to develop a whole theory. For example, if it was announced today that people should volunteer to liberate Petrinja, Drnis, Vukovar or any other seized part of the Croatian homeland, I can swear by my life that the Croatian people will not only volunteer 100 percent, but that they will demand to be sent to fight immediately. He said: Is that possible? That is possible. And I said: That is the impetus which you in the West do not appreciate, or you draw wrong conclusions, or you are not capable of seeing that the historical impetus is so strong in Croatia that when we turn it into a specific task, this is the result.

How come the Croatian Army, under blockade, attacked by an organized machinery which had been preparing for 50 or 70 years, could fight back? Furthermore, how was it possible that we defeated them [as heard] in all battles we have fought so far? When an army is given the impetus of two elements—the first being confidence, and the second being capable of experiencing [words indistinct] victory as a victory, and not as a defeat—these elements speak about far more profound issues.

[Announcer] While we are still talking about Bosnia-Herzegovina, can you tell us about the impact of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the military and general situation in Croatia and what is your view of—we can now openly call it this—the war between the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in central Bosnia, in particular.

[Bobetko] You asked about the impact. Well, it is inevitable that there is an impact. A Croat population lives there and is now being subjected to a double action: First to take over its territory, and to expel the Croatian population and to annihilate it through genocide. In other words, in its own war against the Serb aggressor, Croatia is forced to set aside not a small amount of resources to help her people. There is another point: A great number of people were born in Croatia, is fighting in those units and these people have left their uncles, relatives, brothers, etc. there. It is normal that they tell us: Gentlemen, we have to defend our own homes as well. A large number of these people are now defending Bosnia. And when that man Perisic talks about 60,000 people—well, it seems he has got a good computer and can count the heads—that is no surprise; it would be a surprise if the situation was different. We must develop a kind of human solidarity towards the Croatian population there because it is being subjected to the kind of genocide experienced at Vukovar and on this part of the Croatian territory.

In other words, it is a fact that Bosnia represents a big part of our expenditure, but the Croatian people must accept it both politically and financially. For, this is it, this is our reality.

As for your second question—which I, as a soldier, consider very difficult, but would not like to comment on all its aspects; history will most probably deal with this—but there are several very strange things here. Why are they strange? Well, one can insist on certain rights, one can insist on expanding into this or that territory because as a result of some historical developments the situation developed differently, but to use genocide at the same time and to destroy everything, and to declare the person who until yesterday was your next door neighbor to be your worst enemy is not such a harmless thing. Regardless of all the mistakes made by this or that person, by the people who should have made this or that decision—this in any case is a different issue—but, why is there a need to use a method that should be alien but is being used. This is one of the questions. The other issue is: The most extreme section in the Muslim world has appropriated the right—in fact it has appropriated the right—to decide about the future of that area. It is doing nothing to help find solutions, although these are not impossible to find. Look, when I asked [Bosnian President] Alija Izetbegovic here in Zagreb if he was aware that he sat peacefully and watched the chetniks kill women and children in Foca for the second time without even making preparations to withdraw the people, to tell them: Hide! Withdraw! Arm yourselves! A danger is looming over you!—he said: The war in Croatia has nothing to do with us, it is not our war. He never even went near the village of Ravno, which was the first to be burned down in his republic.

In other words, the people who avail themselves of these rights are not attending negotiations in order to find solutions but are there to provoke further tensions and escalations.

In my opinion, this war is a warning to all people with European and civilizational approaches that a situation

is created in the world, in Europe, for ending such a war. [sentence as heard] It is invented, it is imposed from their side, it is genocidal, it is a war of conquest, and as such must be stopped.

[Announcer] Will the Croatian Army openly intervene in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in what circumstances? A number of high-ranking Croatian officials have hinted at this in their statements.

[Bobetko] First, the Croatian Army has no imperialistic or territorial claims. It has not been organized in this way, but one thing is clear, and the Croatian people should be told clearly: Force and all means will be used against those who attack Croatian territory, regardless of the side from which the attack is launched. Not a single centimeter of Croatian territory will ever be taken by anyone.

[announcer] You mean the Croatian territory of the Croatian state, or in general?

[Bobetko] The Croatian state, the Croatian territories; and we will decide on aid in accordance with our conscience, and with political and other assessments as a sovereign, democratic, European state. No one can take this right away from us and no one can give us a recipe for this. These are fairly sensitive issues, but the Croatian people must know, and they must be told, that there have recently been too many hunters who want their territory. They think that if one catches something, the second one will be successful, too. But they are very wrong. Croatia has set itself a task of patience. It attended all possible negotiations. It even accepted proposals which were sometimes acceptable and sometimes not—all this with a clearly- defined goal in mind—to resolve this territorial issue—very sensitive as far as the world, peace, mankind are concerned—in a peaceful way. However, as you can see, the situation is not just difficult, but also certain systems are being created which hinder such [words indistinct] For this reason the Croatian Army must be prepared, it must be maneuverable, with sufficient expert know-how. Also, the Croatian economy must be organized in such a way that autonomy, that which requires a longer-term process from a country, which examines all its potential, and both national and economic as it turned out; it requires from the Croatian Army to be where it is and do what it is doing. [sentence as heard]

[Announcer] The coming 1994 year could be, to use the cliche, the year of a possible denouement. What do you see as being the main role of the Croatian Army in making this denouement possible?

[Bobetko] So, you have decided that there will be a denouement in 1994.

[Announcer] Well, we are all expecting it. And it would be good if all this is resolved.

[Bobetko] It is absolutely true that it would be a good thing, and I agree with that. However, you see, there is a situation in the world today which should not be ignored, at least not here in the area where we live, but also beyond, and that situation is that the Croatian people have great patience, that there is a mood in the world that this should be stopped, and I personally believe that a resolution in the coming year is not merely possible but also realistic, that there will be resistance and obstacles, and that Croatia will again have to come up with two solutions: A peaceful one that it has pursued so far.

[Announcer] A negotiated solution?

[Bobetko] Yes, very patiently, but not indefinitely. And we have to be prepared for the second one. And Perisic and others should heed this. Croatia must regain its territory. We have the force, the means, and the organization. People can laugh at statements of this kind, but only if they are not capable of viewing the balance of power and the real situation in a realistic way. I therefore believe this—and future negotiations will bear me out because there are things that cannot be postponed indefinitely. In my view, Croatia has provided so many examples and hints that there are limits to its patience. I do not favor hasty actions but I am against opportunism that is detrimental to me.

[Announcer] General Bobetko, thank you for the interview. Of course, I would like to wish you and all members of the Croatian Army all the best in 1994.

[Bobetko] I would like to use this opportunity, as we have not been in touch for a long time, first to extend my New Year's greetings to the Croatian people; second, to tell them that the Croatian Army is guarding our present borders—which we do not consider Croatian borders, but are rather borders of occupied territories—and that it is going to fulfil its task when asked to do so.

Second, or rather third, there is no possibility, not even in theory, that someone can seize, occupy, burn down, or destroy when they please. Those times are long gone. And third, or fourth, there have been attempts at destroying our unity, through very unpleasant methods, but which are sometimes met with a certain degree of support; we have to beware of them now: For example, there have been attempts to destabilize the Croatian Army by saying: Those cadres are members of the old regime, these are communists, those are Ustashas and so on. There is no such thing. I belive that the Croatian Army is a historical example of trust in Croatia. Sons and grandsons of the Croatian countrymen who have been divided by their fate and difference [words indistinct] throughout the world are together in the trenches. This is what the factor of unity is, and the army must oppose the attacks, for I have concluded that some intelligence services have set themselves a task to penetrate into that part as it is the most sensible segment, that is a synonym of the Croatian people in a wider area. [sentence as heard]

For those reasons I am not saying this only to calm you, but I am historically responsible, while holding this post, to act in this way and prepare the Croatian Army in that way.

I would like to extend my New Year's greetings to my soldiers, officers and junior officers. Be alert to a maximum degree and know that the Croatian people have lent you their trust, their sons, and therefore you have to take into account that a new history of the Croatian people is today being written and created.

These are my greetings, and I would just like to say that we are entering a year in which, although many people say I am a pessimist, I believe that we are, nevertheless, moving toward the resolution of many key issues. Thank you very much.

Krajina Election Runoff Postponed to 23 Jan

LD2912154893 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1350 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Excerpt] Knin, 29 Dec (TANJUG)—The second round of elections for the president of the Republic of Serb Krajina is to be held on 23 January 1994, the [Krajina] Republican Electoral Commission decided today. According to the electoral law the second round of elections ought to be held within 15 days, but the electoral commission explained today's decision by saying that "it is not possible to organize the elections at an earlier date due to the coming holidays." [passage omitted]

Babic Accused of Rigging Krajina Elections

AU2912134493 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 20 Dec 93 p 7

[Unattributed report: "'Victors' With Dangerous Intentions"]

[Text] The recent elections in the republic of Serbian Krajina have not yet produced either a new republic president or made good the shortfall of the 10 or so deputies in parliament, while the demand of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] that the entire election be annulled because the ballots were distributed on the streets of Knin before the elections started has not been settled yet. Many things that are ugly, dirty, and even dangerous for the future of this most western Serbian country have come to light.

The triumphant euphoria of Milan Babic's campaign team, pressures that have been put on the members of the republican electoral commission, who are being threatened with assassination if by any chance they dare to annul the elections, thereby overruling Babic's victory, have dangerously run up the temperature among the people of Krajina. Still, as Milan Martic said at the news conference, the lucky thing is that the citizens have been more conscious than those who pushed them into mutual conflicts that have been neither accidental, nor as insignificant as they might appear at first sight.

Attacks on Karadzic

The impatience and nervousness of Babic and his men to take hold of power as soon as possible has resulted in the loss of control. By precipitately announcing the possible mandators for the government many members of Babic's team have revealed the true intentions of the political group that has already once been in open conflict with the overall policy of Serbian interests. What the representatives of the SDS of Krajina tried to conceal in the campaign by slogans about the unification of all Serbian countries, has came to light now that the games about rigging the results and elections to benefit Babic and his party have been uncovered. The unanimous support of the Belgrade opposition for Babic's reported victory, the assertions of Vuk Draskovic that a candidate of Belgrade has been defeated in Knin, have been enthusiastically welcomed by Babic's supporters, issuing comments that Milosevic and Karadzic did not pass in Krajina. When asked during the campaign what relations between the authorities in Knin and those in Belgrade should be like, Babic openly said that the relations had to be good, but one also had to keep in mind that the power structure in the Serbian parliament would definitely change after the Krajina elections. As opposed to Babic, some of his aides, Petar Stikovac, for instance, have abandoned all tactics! They said that Krajina had been in Serbia's shadow too long, and it was about time that Krajina came out of it. Babic's men have openly denounced Karadzic, and announced his imminent fall, thereby making up for their reluctance to openly denounce Milosevic. Lazar Macura, who has already been nominated as a future mandator of the Krajina government, said the evening before last on Knin Television that Karadzic had been touring and canvassing throughout Krajina, which he should not have been allowed to do, since he was a foreign citizen. Most of the people believe it is about yet another piece of "wisdom" that Macura delivered, since he recently suggested dual citizenship for the Krajina people—Croatian and Serbian. Those who are more familiar with Babic's political attitudes, however, are convinced that it is about a much more dangerous game that does not exclude the reinforcement of the separatism within the republic of Srpska, that is, the revival of the political platform about the unification of the former Serbian autonomous region of Krajina [SAO Krajina] and the region of Banja Luka.

Babic's Ministers

On Sunday the elections will be repeated in Knin, Benkovac, and several smaller electoral precincts more. In Babic's campaign team it is believed that it is only a formality that should confirm their convincing victory. Those beliefs are supported by the announcement of the new government team, in which most prominent offices are given to Babic's veterans. Among them there is also Dusan Vjestica, who is supposed to replace Martic as the minister of interior.

Many who know what kind of man Vjestica is, say he is a good choice, since in the past he had a lot to do with police. The courts of justice have exhaustive records on Vjestica, starting with his purchase of the apartment in Knin with funds intended for humanitarian aid to Gracac, to having been kicked out from the firm of Texkometal in Knin because of fraudulent handling, to the epilogue in Gracac, where he performed the function of chairman of the local government, and was banished after having taken part in many criminal acts. As for other ministers that have already been announced by Babic's campaign team, in addition to all the loyal people from his party, there are also two "outsiders" on the list. One of them is Rade Leskovac, representative of the Radicals, and the other is Djordje Bjegovic, a Socialist. Leskovac has not commented on this offer to take up the post of the foreign minister yet, while Bjegovic, shocked by evidence of the rigged elections, has announced he will thoroughly consider whether he should take part in such a parliament.

Italian Minority Leader Explains Demands

AU2912174293 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 22 Dec 93 p 7

[Interview with Italian minority Deputy Furio Radin by Davor Ivankovic; place and date not given: "We Are Not a Trojan Horse"]

[Text] The 43-year-old Italian minority deputy with a Ph.D. in psychology jokes that he is now a professional Italian as well. In the Croatian parliament, he represents the interests of more than 20,000 Italians, whose rights in Croatia are the topic of frequent discussions. Furio Radin has recently returned from Rome, where he represented the Republic of Croatia at the European Conference on Minorities.

[Ivankovic] In Croatia, there is much talk about the term autochthonism, and you insist on that term especially with regards to the Italian minority.

[Radin] Autochthonism refers to all minorities, and not only to the Italians. That term is closely related to the definition of territory in which an ethnic group has lived throughout history. Autochthonous minorities are those that have lived on a certain territory long enough to be able to say that the culture of that territory would not be the same without the contribution of that ethnic group. I usually prefer to say "ethnic group" rather than "minority." Such, for example, is the autochthonism of the Italian ethnic group in Istria and in Kvarner. It is impossible to define the culture of that region without the contribution of Italian culture. Naturally, that presents practical ways to solve the problems of the Italian ethnic group; it is not a theoretical question, although autochthonism is not easily defined by international law.

[Ivankovic] That would imply different treatment for the Italian minority from that for the other minorities?

[Radin] That is tied in to certain special rights granted to ethnic groups. For instance, the Slovenes in Italy, in a certain region, have special rights like those of Burgenland Croats [in Austria] in Austria, but they do not have such rights in Vienna. Therefore, we think that in Istria, Rijeka, and on the Kvarner islands, we must have special rights, and definitely not fewer rights than under the former political system. It is absurd that now, in a democratic system, we must fight for rights that we had under a totalitarian system. We should have more rights now, I would have thought!

[Ivankovic] What do you think about constitutional and legal solutions for the problem in Croatia?

[Radin] In Croatia, the rights of ethnic groups or minorities are solved by the Constitution and the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Rights of Ethnic Groups, National Communities, and Minorities. Unfortunately, minority rights are mostly solved on the basis of the number of minority members and percentages, on the quota principle for participation in local authorities. We think that in Istria, where a great exodus of Italians took place, and everywhere in historical habitats of the Italians, the Italian component should also be represented.

[Ivankovic] What about the demand for bilinguality?

[Radin] Municipalities must decide about the level of bilingualism, and we propose three such levels.

[Ivankovic] That is a solution in accordance with the proposal of the IDS [Istrian Democratic Congress]?

[Radin] That proposal was made in cooperation with the IDS. Generally speaking, we think that in all the municipalities where the Italians are autochthonous, the municipality leaderships should determine one of those three biligualism levels. Naturally, we cannot have the same level of bilingualism in Rovinj and Zminj, where there are hardly any Italians. It would be absurd to do that where there are no Italians. That is my reply to the accusation that we want to introduce bilingualism throughout Istria, which is not true.

[Ivankovic] What is the difference between the present level of the Italian minority's rights and that in the former state?

[Radin] When I say that some rights are less than we had in the former system, I also say that, generally speaking, the situation is better overall than before. This is the origin of the confusion, for people think that when the Italians make demands, they actually feel nostalgia for Yugoslavia, which is absurd. Everything bad that happened to the Italians happened in the country called Yugoslavia!

Furthermore, there are a certain number of rights that, owing to difficulties in the process of changing the political system, have not come into effect yet. The gravity of the minority questions in Croatia has not been understood to the full. For example, now we have the

following problem: To get a bilingual identity card, we must provide proof of our nationality; we must submit documents that prove that we are Italians. That is contrary to all the laws, even the Croatian Constitution. Earlier, all the inhabitants of a municipality, or all those who wanted one, could have bilingual identity cards. If somebody does not want to have a bilingual identity card, he or she should not get it, but I think that a bilingual identity card must be an indicator of territorial and not of national singularity. I still have no bilingual identity card, because I do not need to prove my nationality. My word must be trusted. There is no unsolvable problem in Istria, we only need a little goodwill.

[Ivankovic] Is there none?

[Radin] One part of the ruling party, the more authoritarian one, has lately not displayed any. I think that President Tudjman's two speeches about Istria contributed to the lack of trust. That was not necessary, for Istria is part of Croatia and a bridge between Croatia and Italy.

[Ivankovic] Which of your demands have not been met?

[Radin] A Memorandum between Croatia and Italy was signed in January 1992; it was conceived as tripartite, but Slovenia has not signed it yet. It contains about some very basic things, which we are now demanding. One of them is not to fall below the level of acquired rights (bilingualism, identity cards, etc...). It concerns the participation of the Italian ethnic group in authorities and local self-government. Furthermore, the Italian ethnic group, respecting the sovereignty of Croatia and Slovenia, regards itself as a unique Italian ethnic group in two countries, and the Memorandum says that the integrity of that group must not be violated. We must acquire approximately the same level of protection for Italians in both countries.

[Ivankovic] The status of the Serbs and the Italians is often compared. The Serbs get districts, so do the Italians demand districts as well?

[Radin] It cannot be compared. The rights of a group forming more than 8 percent of the total population are regulated in a different way. The rights demanded by the Serbian community must be absolutely differentiated from what the Italians are demanding for themselves. The solution of the Istria problem is a matter of relations between the central authorities and the counties. I think that we can expect the imminent regionalization of Croatia, which would give the counties more opportunity to express their singularities. No one in Istria thinks those two problems are connected.

[Ivankovic] To what extent do the Italian state and its bureaucracy politically influence the solving of your demands? There is talk about financial aid amounting to 4 billion Italian lire.

[Radin] This is financial aid in material, equipment, and investment to restore certain buildings, for example. We have been receiving that aid for a number of years, and I am surprised that it is now being discussed as something new. Concerning the 4 billion Italian lire, this is yet to be received, though we hope that it will be. As for the attention of the Italian state to the Italians in Croatia and Slovenia, this is natural, as that group is actually the only Italian minority in the world! It is normal that the Italian state should pay special attention to that group.

[Ivankovic] Can you link that sensibility to the latest political events in Italy?

[Radin] Both the Italian minority and I, personally, are satisfied with the outcome of the elections, especially in Trieste. The victory of the right in Trieste would have been far less favorable for us. In Italy, there is a phenomenon of polarization of votes generally to the left and the right, which are not so in the traditional sense. We in Istria do not favor right-wing solutions at all, for that would make the problem of Istria even worse. We prefer centralist options, those that are today untraditionally considered left-wing. We have had quite a few contacts with the Italian political leadership lately, which was very understanding. We both understand that, in the situation in which Croatia is at present, we cannot get all our demands immediately. We must be patient, but we must at least get some positive indications. Nevertheless, there are some encouraging signals, which I noticed speaking to our ambassador in Rome, Davorin Rudolf. I believe that our problems in Croatia will soon be solved.

[Ivankovic] How do you view the problematic statements by some influential Italian politicians about the territorial sovereignty of Croatia?

[Radin] That has nothing to do with problems of the ethnic Italians. I would call it a product of the pre-election political game in Italy.

[Ivankovic] Do you think that there is a danger of being regarded as a "Trojan Horse" in relations between Croatia and Italy?

[Radin] There is no such danger. We are the connecting tissue. We have absolutely no intentions for the ethnic Italians in Croatia to act as a kind of Trojan Horse, or to be used as such.

[Box, p 7]

"OK for Coca-Cola, OK for Italians, too!"

Many dilemmas arise when we say that we are one Italian ethnic group in two countries, in Croatia and in Slovenia. Let me explain that. I often say, and I am joking of course, that, if Coca-Cola can be sold in 150 countries, then I suppose that we can be one organization in two countries. We have institutions that act both in Croatia and in Slovenia, we only demand the freedom to operate in two countries. While respecting their sovereignty, of course. We publish newspapers, for example, for our people in both Croatia and Slovenia; the Center for Historical Research in Rovinj serves Italians from both side of the border. We demand free passage across the border in Istria, a European

border: There can be a state border, but there should be as little of it as possible. We demand that especially because of the Italians in Slovenia, and there are only 4,000 of them. They are very vulnerable as a small group, and there is a serious possibility that they will be assimilated, if they are not helped by a larger group such as us in Croatia. We are, therefore, very interested in improving relations between Slovenia and Croatia and in having Croatia integrated into Europe as soon as possible.

There are differences of status: The Italians in Slovenia have an integral bilingualism, Italian is an official language there (in certain regions), but that is not the case anywhere in Croatia. And the Italians are considered an autochthonous ethnic group there, too. However, we have political problems in Slovenia as well, for the Slovene authorities have cut half of the Italian programs on Koper television, and we will not accept that.

Federal

Anti-Inflation Measures To Be Implemented

LD2912140293 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1322 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Belgrade, Dec 29 (TANJUG)—Implementation of rigorous anti-inflation measures to curb the runaway hyperinflation will start immediately after the new year. The monthly inflation rate in November was slightly over 20,000 percent and is estimated to reach 200,000 percent in December.

The measures are also geared to save the national currency and ensure the survival of the population and economy until the removal of the economic blockade, government sources told TANJUG on Wednesday. The sanctions imposed against Yugoslavia by the UN Security Council 19 months ago have devasted the economy and threaten the survival of a vast majority of Yugoslavs.

According to reports that could not be immediately confirmed, financing of public spending and the economy with newly-printed currency will be abruptly curtailed, and public spending will be reduced to within the real gross national product (GNP). In 1990, the GNP in the Yugoslav Republics of Serbia and Montenegro was 3,000 US dollars [as received]. After the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and imposition of sanctions, it plunged to around 250 dollars.

The government said earlier it would take the dire social situation into account when formulating the new measures. Social welfare is expected to be taken over by the government, meaning that the economy would no longer bear the burden of workers laid off because of the sanctions. It is estimated that one million employed Yugoslavs support around 10 million people, including the 600,000 registered refugees from the former Yugoslav republics. According to the Belgrade daily POLITIKA, the government package imposes wage controls while prices will remain free.

Official Predicts Gradual Lifting of Sanctions

AU2912171093 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Statement by Deputy Federal Prime Minister Zeljko Simic; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] I personally doubt that the sanctions will be lifted automatically, because this is a very difficult job. There is a fairly difficult and complicated procedure, but I do believe in the gradual lifting of the sanctions, which would be very important for us because it would facilitate the revival of business life and at least stabilize the economic-monetary situation. I believe that this is indeed in sight.

Whether this is a coincidence or not, this is also being confirmed in a statement by Mr. Churkin, who said today that the lifting of the sanctions has nothing to do with the preelection campaign, and that the international community must urgently discuss the issue of sanctions. All the reasons that existed, and some of them are part of the Security Council resolutions, have disappeared. They are no longer resting on any foundations. They are not even mentioned by anyone any more.

Army Chief Discusses Balkan Conflicts

LD2912183093 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1137 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 29 Dec (TANJUG)—Lieutenant Colonel-General Momcilo Perisic, chief of General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, today received representatives of the TANJUG news agency and the VOJSKA magazine.

The TANJUG delegation included Dusan Zupan, TANJUG chief and executive editor, Pero Sparavalo, executive editor of the home affairs newsdesk, and Sinisa Ljepojevic, editor of the political section, while VOJSKA magazine was represented by acting chief and executive editor Col. Stanoje Jovanovic, deputy chief and executive editor Lt.Col Milorad Pantelic, and magazine editor Lt.Col Dragan Pantelic.

Gen. Perisic granted an interview to TANJUG and Vojska magazine. We are carrying the full version of the interview.

[Question] You have been chief of general staff of the Yugoslav army for four months now. In your opinion what are the strategic directions of the general staff of the Yugoslav army in these circumstances?

[Perisic] I am deeply aware of the responsibility of my position but I accepted it, understanding my profession, above all, in terms of a constant confrontation with the issues of responsibility and authority. Four months is not enough to take stock but the changes taking place could be described as explosive. I have entered a system and the dynamics of that system and my task is to master the dynamics and influence them decisively. I could not do this alone and that is why I am forming a team which has enough strength and knowledge to accomplish the key goals of the general staff. In my opinion these goals are the reform of the general staff of the Yugoslav army, the strengthening of units to such an extent that they can react operationally to any change in the situation which could threaten our territory, and at the same time strict and consistent respect for the principles of the nonparty and apolitical status of the Yugoslav army.

[Question] What is your assessment of the problems of war and peace in the Balkan region and of the events in former Yugoslavia? What is the influence of the military factor in international relations?

[Perisic] Unfortunately, the Balkans today are a region in which the laws of civil, ethnic, and religious war prevail and they are burdened with war tension which is difficult to bear. I do not want to speak about the reasons and motives for the war. I think that at this stage of the

conflict this is known but I would like to say something about the prospects for peace. I am aware that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been stimulated by an unbalanced attitude toward the warring sides and that peace is not possible while Serbs are being blamed for the Muslim rejection of solutions and their militant option. The largest international military industries are involved on the Balkan battlefield as well as the global military mafia. However, the major powers which to a large extent stimulated the war by their policy are slow to realize the extent of the danger posed by the Balkan hotbed and the fact that it might not be controllable in a possible phase of global Balkan conflict. This could endanger the whole of Europe, including the states which so easily blessed the secession and the breaking-up of Yugoslavia, even to the extent of rewarding separatism with generous military aid.

The military factor is still very important as far as the realization of the major powers' interests is concerned. As there is only one such left, it could be said that the global military might, including UN forces to a certain extent, have been mobilized to accomplish the strategic interests of that superpower.

[Question] The radically changed military and political conditions in which we live and our experiences from the latest war have imposed a need for a review of our defense policy and military doctrine. What are the main directions of that policy and what is the role of the army in it?

[Perisic] Our defense policy must be based on interests and potentials of our state and society. It is necessary to carry out a radical revision and redefinition of the defense policy and doctrine which through inertia continue to be part of the philosophy of nonprofessional fighting. Modern warfare requires professionals, and therefore conceptual volunteerism must be removed even at the time of defining the basic foundations for the defense policy of the country and its military doctrine. Work on these documents is in the final phase, but the Yugoslav Army, in process of having its operational and strategic dimensions drawn up, cannot wait for the definitive version of these very important documents. I believe that laws cannot change practise, they should rather be drawn up in accordance with its requirements.

In line with this, the Yugoslav Army is becoming a modern, flexible armed force with an elite professional nucleus, which has a good understanding of politics but does not interfere in it, and is capable of doing its job in all conditions. The fatherland and its freedom, the preservation of life of its soldiers and putting the enemy out of action, these are criteria for the success of a good army. Professional training is a condition for that.

[Question] Military laws on the army and defense have been adopted and came into effect on 6 November. What do they mean in the legal sense for the initiated transformation of the Yugoslav Army? What has been done in that process?

[Perisic] The laws are only a legal framework for the reforms of the Yugoslav Army. Everything else is a matter of creativity in the cadre, professional and conceptual sense. Although the process of transformation is in the full swing it is not going to be completed soon. The dynamism of development of military forces in the world today, in my opinion, makes the process of transformation and reform endless, it is never completed. However, what we have here are key interventions as fundamental values on which the army rests have changed.

[Question] When you became chief of general staff you said that you would do everything to reestablish the Yugoslav Army's reputation. What do you think about the current status of the army in our society?

[Perisic] This idea is my challenge. I think that the Yugoslav army has not lost its reputation in a significant way. However, it is being held responsible for the actions of the former Yugoslav People's Army. Certain unpleasant scandals have been unfairly blamed on all members of the Yugoslav Army. Unavoidably, and I think in a principled manner, we are getting rid of people who have tarnished the reputation of the Yugoslav Army with their deeds or their misdeeds. On the other hand, a syndrome of the unjust allocation of responsibility exists. Part of the public insists on our nonparty status and at the same time blames us for not being more energetic in preserving the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was a great illusion that the Yugoslav People's Army could have survived the breakdown of its state, and part of our reputation has been tarnished because of this. A part of this military leadership inspired this illusion, unaware that they were unable to prevent the breakup along ethnic lines.

It is only through honesty, honor, and patriotism—which will not be used for political ends but will be an important characteristic of officers and soldiers belonging to an army with a developed victorious psychology—that we can restore and preserve this reputation.

[Question] Two current demands are that the Yugoslav Army should be economical and professional. How can they be realized in this economic situation?

[Perisic] Only an army which is able to carry out its tasks in a professional way can be economical. Both dimensions are a part of the same imperative. An economical attitude when poverty is everywhere around us, has been simply imposed on us owing to the lack of financial means. However, instead of improvising, we are trying to provide conditions so that creative intelligence could prevail in the system. Intelligence by itself cannot be compensation for the lack of money forever and there is a danger of a brain-drain. That is why in a state's defense policy it is important to define precisely the dimension of all of its key elements and of the army itself. Our responsibility is to say what should be done in this sense, based on an analysis of the current situation. For its part,

the state should determine the dimension of the army in accordance with its material resources. A state can be defended successfully if the relation between needs and resources is optimal.

[Question] How does the Yugoslav Army ensure the necessary level ofcombat readiness in these complex circumstances?

[Perisic] We have a good many difficulties but our possibilities remain considerable. We are armed with powerful missile systems for air defense and anti-tank warfare and we have powerful artillery and armored units. The air force and air defense and navy have similar forces and equipment at their disposal. We are ready in every respect to inflict heavy blows on the aggressor. However, as a result of the sanctions, the process of modernization has been slowed down and virtually brought to a standstill. We are not in a position to monitor progressively the development of the most modern systems in the sphere of armaments and military equipment. These circumstances are objective and cannot be eliminated completely even by our greatest efforts. However, until things change to our advantage, we are compelled to find reserves from among our existing resources.

During this year, and especially in the first quarter, we succeeded in rectifying and restoring to a state of combat readiness several thousand technical and material facilities which had been put out of action in military operations during the withdrawal from the former Yugoslav republics. We have also succeeded in making a start—in the framework of existing capacities—on the development of a new tank for withdrawing people and equipment under fire: (prototype development to begin in 1994), and on the development of a large number of special technical resources which used to be manufactured in republics which have broken away from Yugoslavia. We are convinced that, by the professional and rational use of the technical potential which we created and preserved earlier, our army, if it is well led and if it is led in the interests of the freedom of the people and the fatherland, could be stronger than any force which might attempt aggression.

[Question] What is being done to protect the living standards of professional members of the Yugoslav Army? How many officers have left active military service over the past two years?

[Perisic] We are in a very difficult situation. Material hardship has squeezed the Yugoslav Army, particularly the living standards of officers and their families, and recently also of soldiers in barracks. In such circumstances it is difficult to ensure the professional concentration of junior and senior commanders who are living below all criteria which define a living standard, and they have been entrusted with the most precious generation of young people. We have taken some measures in cooperation with the Defense Ministry, but in the conditions of monetary chaos it is not possible to preserve the value of money, because this can be achieved only by the rapid purchase of foreign currency on the street. Whoever fails to do this is immediately overtaken by poverty, and officers cannot be black-marketeers in order to survive.

Solutions are being prepared whereby the most endangered families—those without an apartment—are given financial assistance to cover part of the cost of renting in the private sector. A social program envisages the adaptation of military buildings into temporary housing for families without homes and envisages the securing of necessary accommodation for about 350 families and 150 individuals. We are undertaking some other measures, but we will not be able to do anything on our own. Social problems in the army, if there is a further decline in the basic living standard, are almost certain. This is also an answer to the part of your question relating to the gradual decline in cadres. [passage omitted]

[Question] How should professional requirements being set for the new army and its members be fulfilled? Are rejuvenation and training on new bases key starting points for serious changes?

[Perisic] Strict professional requirements have actually been set by the cruel reality of war. Our experience says that only real professionals successfully resisted war atrocities, kept their troops together and led them to victory. Only professional officers and junior officers can train a soldier to develop abilities necessary for fighting in a victorious army. Rejuvenation is an inevitable process, without which there would be no vital energy nor fresh ideas. Those are precisely young cadres educated to respect the sanctity of their profession and be loyal to their fatherland that represent a key condition for the definitive departure of the army burdened with ideology and establishment of values based on top-class performance of their honorable profession. [passage omitted]

[Question] Despite everything that happened in the region of former Yugoslavia, to what extent are our institutes and specific-purpose plants managing to keep in step with contemporary global trends in the modernization of arms and military equipment? What up-to-date modern weapons systems have they provided the army with?

[Perisic] I have already spoken about that. Considering the financial situation we are in, it is extremely difficult to keep pace with global trends in the development of the most up-to-date generations of weapons. However, we did not stop at the existing generations but are developing and modernizing certain systems that do not require major investments. We have reinvigorated the vital branches of the arms industry, especially those involved in the regular production of armoured and artillery systems and ammunition.

[Question] How can we make a successful match between the old and new ways of nurturing patriotism? How and when will new insignia be adopted, holidays

designated for the Yugoslav Army, its branches of service and departments, and will uniforms undergo any changes?

[Perisic] We shall not discard anything that was good or glorify the parts of our heritage haunting us. We will adopt and nurture the best traditions from the military past of the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples, but not as a consequence of a sudden craving for a return to the romantic past. At the proposal of the Yugoslav Army's General Staff, the Supreme Defense Council decided to proclaim 16 June Yugoslav Army day. It has adopted dates for the holidays for specific branches of service and the Yugoslav Army's coat-of-arms which will serve as the basis for all other symbols.

[Question] Is the Yugoslav Army's professional composition in proportion to the national structure of the FRY? What happens to the officers and civilians who did not manage to obtain FRY citizenship within the mandatory six-month period?

[Perisic] The present composition of the Yugoslav Army's professional personnel has been determined by the situation in the former Yugoslav People's Army and the transformations that occurred in the meantime, including the results of these changes so far. The national composition is as follows: Serbs and Montenegrins 75.6 percent, Yugoslavs 9.7 percent, and the rest 14.7 percent. A total of 66.8 percent were born on the territory of the FRY while 33.2 percent were born in other parts of the former Yugoslavia. There is a certain degree of disproportion in the present composition of command personnel—between the number of higher ranking and lower ranking officers which is a result of a situation prevalent over a longer period of time and which complicates the conducting of personnel policies to a certain extent. However, this problem is being solved by the planned retirement of a certain number of high-ranking officers, so that we will coordinate these numbers in a relatively short time and adjust them to our needs.

I believe that the citizenship law provides enough time for the granting of FRY citizenship to all those who do not have it at present due to their place of birth.

[Question] You took part in the successful withdrawal of parts of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] from besieged barracks and garrisons. In Capljina you carried out a spectacular action of releasing the soldiers and officers who had been encircled. On the basis of your own experience we would like you to give us a definition of an officer's courage and also of betrayal.

[Perisic] I don't want to speak about myself personally, but commanders and their soldiers demonstrated their utmost, almost legendary courage, skill and know-how in these actions. No action in the war is spectacular because someone would like it to be so. A high level of organization and the achievement of goals require common sense and not a desire for spectacular actions.

I do not know the definition of courage since all definitions insufficiently describe the borderline between courage and fear but I know that one has to overcome a very strong emotion and convey this feeling to others. The courage of a soldier also means the understanding of the shortest way to victory.

Betrayal is worthy of every contempt. History will judge who was a traitor in the civil war. I am certain, however, that at the beginning of the war in Yugoslavia, while the JNA still existed, there were attempts to justify the personal inability of certain military leaders by the betrayal of part of the officer cadre who ran off to their own national armies.

[Question] What is your assessment of the further development of the military situation in the republic of Srpska and the republic of Serb Krajina?

[Perisic] I hope for peace, but I fear the continuation of the war. There are realistic possibilities for either to happen. The Serbian people must have their own state and they had to defend their territory by force, not taking anything that belonged to others. Peace is possible if everyone's equal right to self-determination is recognized, and war—if the enemies of Serbs are further encouraged to realize their goals by exhausting the FRY and all Serbian states through economic and military means. The reasons for continuing the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina can no longer be operational and strategic.

The situation in the republic of Srpska is slightly different. Croatia does not have sufficient military power to carry out a strategic operation against the republic of Serb Krajina because it has been economically and biologically exhausted by the war and it has over 60,000 soldiers in central Bosnia. This is why "attrition tactics" are possible, such as operations in the Maslenica area and in Divoselo. The Serbian people in both republics have enough strength to preserve the room they need defend the right to live in their own state.

[Question] How do you see the spreading of information about and in the Yugoslav Army? In that context, what is the role of TANJUG and the paper VOJSKA which have the same task in that area?

[Perisic] To inform the public about the Yugoslav Army is an activity which is very important both for the army and the Yugoslav public. We are trying to be completely open, but our openness implies strict adherence to objectivity on the part of all media and respect for professional ethics. We will not be angry if we are publicly criticized, but is is unjust that some commentators should publicly project their personal positions on editorial boards, the level of cynicism or their ignorance through a public nihilism concerning the Yugoslav Army [as received]. We want the media to help us complete our professional tasks in the best possible way, without the currently fashionable ostracizing of the army and the public flogging of people who cannot defend themselves lest they be accused of involvement in politics.

TANJUG is an agency whose good reputation in the world is beyond dispute and whose news is trusted. Almost without exception, the Yugoslav army has had the best experience in dealing with that agency. The paper VOJSKA is of exceptional importance for all our members and the citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It has been a great pleasure to answer your questions.

Let me wish happy new 1994 to your editorial boards, readers, and customers.

Serbia

SPS Prepared To Discuss Coalition Government

AU2912151293 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] The republican government will be formed according to the constitutional procedure and the law on elections, stated Ivica Dacic, spokesman of the Socialist Party of Serbia, at a meeting of the party's district committee in Pirot. We have not discussed the future prime-minister designate yet, but we are ready to discuss potential candidates for the government with all political parties. This would not be for the prestige of the party, but for the benefit of the Serbian people and the prosperity of the Serbian state, Dacic said.

Sarajevo Evacuees Arrive in Serbian Village

LD2912153393 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1506 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Excerpts] Banja Koviljaca, 29 Dec (TANJUG)—After a short stop in Zvornik, a group of 71 Sarajevo citizens arrived in Banja Koviljaca today. [passage omitted] Around 140 citizens of Sarajevo reached Pale. Half of them stayed in the Serb republic and the other half arrived in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. [passage omitted]

Montenegro

Commentary Warns Against Sarajevo Partition

AU2912131193 Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 17 Dec 93 p 10

[Commentary by Stanko Cerovic: "With the Feeling of Defeat"]

[Text] There is both reliable news and thousands of rumors about intensive, secret contacts, negotiations, and agreements among the warring factions throughout Bosnia. Talks have been taking place at the highest level in Geneva, and at the level of the authorities in Belgrade and Zagreb, while in Bosnia they are carried out among Karadzic, Boban, and Izetbegovic. Finally, there are talks going on between various local chiefs for whom no one can say for sure whether they are carrying out the will of the central authorities or acting on their own initiative. It explains the chaos in which agreements have been made and the speed in which alliances have been formed and broken. This creates the impression of a destroyed society and devastated country, where with the widespread absence of the law certain rules—incomprehensible for a healthy mind—function quite well, rather than an impression of approaching peace.

Dissection of Sarajevo

One thing seems to be clear to the observers, though: Right now the negotiations between Muslims and Serbs are more frequent and promising than between the Muslims and Croats, or even between Croats and Serbs. It seems clear that the Croato-Muslim relations have almost definitely collapsed, while there are obviously intensive talks between Muslims and Serbs in the field, in Bosnia itself, but it would be rather hasty to suppose that Belgrade has really replaced the old, long-term agreement with Croats with some definite pro-Muslim strategy.

Now, this process of carving Bosnia up into pieces, its fragmentation, impossible partitions, and grotesque agreements has spread to Sarajevo as well. It has been officially stated, and not only once, by both the Serbian and Bosnian authorities that they are negotiating the division of Sarajevo. The city has never been large enough to make possible the division into several towns. Serbs, Croats, and Muslims have never been geographically separated in it, while the Miljacka River, which divides the city into two parts, is all too small. It is more like a creek than a river. It hardly separates neighbors, let alone peoples and states!

The people there have the same, hard, and old-fashioned mentality, easily recognizable even in relation to the mentality of other Bosnians, not to mention the more obvious differences. In the course of the war, however, the citizens of various nationalities have drawn more closely together, as it were; they have coalesced more than ever. Perhaps before the war it might have been conceivable to say "let the Serbs go on one side, the Croats on another, and the Muslims on the third," and the citizens would not have protested so much. Now, joined in the common, undescribable and unforgettable tragedy, which all three peoples have somehow survived, they feel closer than ever. In Sarajevo I have witnessed such episodes: You are standing on the street with a Serb and a Croat, than suddenly a Muslim approaches. He has not seen them for a long time, so he starts hugging and kissing them, and thankful that they are still there. I guess they did not hug each other just like that before the war, without any special reason. Now, just imagine this Muslim, who until yesterday hugged his fellow-citizens, happy that they were still together, suddenly telling them tomorrow: "Go away, go to your parts of town!" And if it comes to the division of Sarajevo, it will happen only at the moment when Sarajevo's remaining, healthy-minded and uninjured citizens merge into one body and one soul.

It is interesting that while these talks between the Serbian and Bosnian authorities are going on, and while the negotiations about the division are advancing, from time to time shells are pounding the city, creating carnage, even out in the schools, as at the very beginning of the war. One does not know whether the shelling is a sign that the negotiations are taking a good course, or a bad one. And it is also possible that the negotiating sides are getting closer to a final agreement, so they are celebrating it.

It could also be that in this way the Serbs are demonstrating the will of the victor. Because, they know that the current Bosnian authorities are not really beloved in Sarajevo, they know what the Sarajevans are thinking about the division of the city, that they resent their own negotiators. The Serbs know that the talks on the division will estrange the people from the authorities even more, but precisely for that reason they are showing as openly as possible what the dictate of the victor is like: It is painful and leaves no hope.

Do not let anybody think that Serbs want to sign the peace agreement because they are tired or weakened: It is more like a present to the citizens, for which they should be grateful, although accompanied by shells. Whether the Bosnian authorities have any other way out than to negotiate in the worst circumstances with the victors, particularly in view of the fact that the international community is putting great pressure on them, is really difficult to say. It would be definitely unfavorable, and present no prospects for the future, however, if those negotiations were to be completed in a way that would make Sarajevo's Croats feel abandoned.

It is one thing to wage war against the Croatian Defense Council, and stir it up in Sarajevo, because the very existence of that war is senseless, while it is a different thing to forge any plans about the alliance of two peoples against the third one in Bosnia, whose interests, to be honest, are better represented by the well-respected Vinko Puljic, than by Mate Boban and Franjo Tudjman. In any case, in these negotiations about Sarajevo, just as elsewhere in Bosnia, it is clear that the Serbs are enjoying their comfortable position as victor. They are manipulating Muslims and Croats, one moment assisting the former, while the next assisting the latter, as the Croats did at the beginning of the war, but with much less success, and much more naivete; that is why they happen to be in such a blind alley today, because of the farsightedness of the Zagreb government.

Propaganda Works

Someone has won, and someone's will is being at least partly carried out, while that someone happens to be sitting in the Serbian camp, somewhere in Belgrade or Bosnia. Still, when the Serbs in Serbia, or Vojvodina, or even in Bosnia—speaking of ordinary people—hear that they are referred to as victors, they are stunned. They know that they have never been in such a bad situation in their whole lives, while those who are familiar with the history of their people can tell them that neither the Serbian people, nor its state has ever fallen in such a deep abyss as this time. Even the members of the Belgrade administration themselves refrain from saying they have won, because they are afraid citizens might understand it literally and demand reimbursement one day. All that the official propaganda is trying to do these days is to prove that Serbia is not to blame for the war, and to possibly convince the people that it is making efforts to bring it to an end.

Perhaps even the notorious nationalists, and even war criminals—either those who acquired wealth in this war, or those who satisfied their inadequately restrained animal instincts—do not feel like victors: Their lives are not all roses. Still, one has to play the role of the victor, simply because there are too many defeated. The feeling of defeat is most obvious precisely in the fate of Sarajevo. Not only because of the devastation, which is no less considerable in Mostar, but also because Sarajevo has become a symbol of defense of not only the civil and civilizational idea of Bosnia, but also of the entire civil opposition throughout former Yugoslavia.

And now, such a Sarajevo is supposed to be geographically chopped into pieces, making its name hardly applicable. No other reaction will be possible in Sarajevo and elsewhere to that option that resignation, just like when a man sighs with relief because a hard, tiring life is brought to an end, after which even death itself is a relief. People have already started to react in such a way to new massacres in Sarajevo: with resignation and without excitement. It is hardly news when an elementary school is shelled?! Such resignation in the face of the worst crimes, because they are happening again and again with inevitability and monotony, must be a sign of a great defeat.

What has prevailed is the national concept of the state that prevents the functioning of the state; the romantic concept of history that negates and obliterates the history of one people; and the concept of life based on violence and humiliation, where there is no place for human feelings. Not even Milosevic dares to boast in Belgrade such a program and final result. The criminals have won over humans, and some diseases have triumphed over life in Sarajevo and Bosnia, and those peoples and individuals who recognize themselves in that process are the victors.

Opposition Blames Authorities for 'All Evils'

AU2912170693 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Report by Miodrag Vukovic]

[Text] The third day of the Montenegrin Parliament's work started in a very tempestuous way. Instead of holding a discussion on adjustments to the budget, as was planned, the opposition, because of the media law that was adopted early this morning and in whose adoption it did not take part, wanted to express public

protest. This was done by Novak Kilibarda, leader of the Montenegrin People's Party, on behalf of the parliamentary opposition parties. He accused the party in power of suppressing democracy, closing public media, and manipulating the public at home.

The dispute, which led to the Montenegrin opposition abstaining from voting, was triggered by the clause on the representation of members of opposition parties in management boards of the Montenegrin media in line with their representation in the republican parliament, and the clause that states that chief editors and directors should be elected by the management boards.

The discussion on adjustments to the Montenegrin budget was preceded by tempestuous speeches by mainly members of the opposition, who again blamed the ruling party for all evils, especially the sanctions, whose effects are not the only culprit for the current humiliating situation in which the Montenegrins have found themselves. The ruling party is not able to ensure the unified Yugoslav market, members of opposition claimed, and is therefore allowing Serbia to blackmail it and close the valves on the republican border.

Therefore, the work of the Montenegrin Assembly has been marked by accessions, often unsubstantiated accusations. It is difficult to expect the parliament to end their work today, even if it works late into the night, as happened yesterday.

Kosovo

Organizers of Kosovo Sportsman Award Detained

LD2912135893 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1311 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Excerpt] Pristina, 29 Dec (TANJUG)—Members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from Pristina yesterday prevented the holding of the Kosovo sportsman of the year awards ceremony, organized by the so-called sports federation of "the Republic of Kosovo."

According to the security center in Pristina, this was done as the meeting had not been announced and because it had a political background. This alleged sports ceremony, as the Secretariat for Internal Affairs explained, was organized "to confirm and affirm the separatist aspiration on Kosovo's secession from Serbia," which is obvious from the very name of the ceremony and the awards for the sportsmen who present themselves as the sportsmen of "the Republic of Kosovo."

The awards and other documents with separatist content were confiscated, and a group of organizers of the illegal meeting was detained. [passage omitted]

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